

Special Section: Four Waves Theory

The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It's Not Waves, It's Strains

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David Rapoport's concept of Four Waves of terrorism, from Anarchist terrorism in the 1880s, through Nationalist and Marxist waves in the early and mid-twentieth century, to the present Religious Wave, is one of the most influential concepts in terrorism studies. However, this article argues that thinking about different types of terrorism as strains rather than waves better reflects both the empirical reality and the idea that terrorists learn from and emulate each other. Whereas the notion of waves suggests distinct iterations of terrorist violence driven by successive broad historical trends, the concept of strains and contagion emphasizes how terrorist groups draw on both contemporary and historical lessons in the development of their tactics, strategies, and goals. The authors identify four distinct strains in total—Socialist, Nationalist, Religious, and Exclusionist—and contend that it is possible to trace each strain back to a "patient zero" active in the 1850s.

Keywords Anarchist, Exclusionist, horsemen, Huntington, Marxist, Nationalist, Rapoport, Religious, Socialist, strains, waves

After Al Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, David Rapoport published one of the most influential articles ever written in the field of terrorism studies.¹ The article has since been republished and referenced

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in numerous volumes.² To this day, it provides the basic conceptual framework for many academic courses taught around the world on this subject. Rapoport's premise was clean and simple: much as Samuel Huntington argued that democratization came in waves,³ Rapoport identified four broadly consecutive waves of terrorism. The first—which he dubbed the Anarchist Wave—started with the Russian populist group *Narodnaya Volya* (the People's Will) in the 1880s and continued into the early decades of the twentieth century. It was followed by an anti-Colonial wave from the 1920s to the 1960s, a New Left Wave from the 1960s to the end of the twentieth century, and a Religious Wave beginning in 1979 that is still with us today.⁴ Rapoport used this Wave Theory to predict that the Religious Wave, which had given birth to Al Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State, could dissipate by 2025 and that a new wave might then emerge.⁵

In fairness to Rapoport, he noted that there were other groups, for example the Ku Klux Klan between 1865 and 1876, which employed terrorist violence and yet did not fit neatly into his template. However, he essentially dismissed such examples as statistical outliers that had little impact on the development of terrorism as a phenomenon over time.⁶ He also observed that some groups within each wave had non-dominant characteristics in common with groups in the other waves. For example, the Provisional IRA of the 1970s and 1980s was both Nationalist and Marxist. But the deeper one explores Rapoport's theory, the more difficult it becomes to escape the suspicion that he took the analogy of the wave too far. He describes each wave as having an international character “driven by a predominant energy that shapes the participating groups' characteristics and mutual relationships.”⁷ This results in “a cycle of activity in a given time period . . . characterized by expansion and contraction phases.”⁸ But is this really what happens? We find particularly problematic Rapoport's assertion that “when a wave's energy cannot inspire new organizations, the wave disappears.”⁹ Indeed, there is very little evidence that the activities associated with any of his Four Waves have actually disappeared, and there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that each type of terrorism has deeper historical roots than his Wave Theory suggests.

It is our contention that the strategic and tactical choices terrorist organizations make play an important role in the evolution of terrorism. Even isolated outbreaks of terrorist violence can influence the choices made by later terrorist groups. To be sure, like other political organizations, terrorists learn first and foremost from their immediate rivals and other likeminded groups.¹⁰ However, there is also considerable evidence of consistent and dynamic exchange of ideas between terrorist groups of markedly different character that stretches back several decades further than Rapoport suggests, to the middle of the nineteenth century. While Rapoport's theory provides a simple and conceptually clean narrative to help students and researchers alike to organize their thoughts, there are simply too many anomalies. More significantly, some of these outlying cases have been very influential in the sense that they provided important lessons or inspiration for later terrorist groups (including the main groups in each of Rapoport's waves) and thus played an integral role in the evolution of terrorism over the past 150 years.

We therefore propose an alternative framework for analysis, based on the idea that terrorism comes in four different strains and that there is an important element of “contagion” both within and between these separate strains. We believe that it may even be possible to identify a “patient zero” for each strain: an individual who either through advocacy or example first promoted the innovative adoption of terrorist methods to advance a particular political cause. The concept of four strains fits the historical record better, and more plausibly explains how terrorism spreads and evolves from one conflict to the next.

The four strains we have identified all date from the same period, and although they have mostly developed separately since, they do occasionally combine and mutate. These four strains—these four horsemen of terrorism—are *Nationalism, Socialism, Religious Extremism, and Social Exclusion*. Using Boaz Ganor's definition of terrorism—"the intentional use of or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims"—as our criteria, we have compared both theories against the historical record to determine which ultimately offers the greater theoretical leverage over recorded events.

Terrorist Groups as Learning Organizations

There is a rich sociological literature on how and under what context organizations learn from their peers and rivals, associated with scholars such as Barbara Levitt and James G. March.¹¹ Non-state organizations learn both from direct experience and from the stories they develop to make sense of that experience, as well as from experiences and stories generated by peers. Organizations that interact regularly with direct competitors learn from both their own and their rivals' successes. The fields of Anthropology and Communication Studies have generated similar theories about the contagiousness of ideas to explain the diffusion of innovative practices across societies.¹² Analyzing how West European conservative parties had learned from the successful post-war initiatives of Social Democrats to revitalize their own electoral programs, party organizations, and electoral strategy, Maurice Duverger labeled this "contagion from the left."¹³ A few decades later, it would be the center-Left parties that "modernized" through a process of "contagion from the right."¹⁴

The German terrorism expert Peter Waldmann was one of the first to reference this kind of "contagion effect" for terrorist groups, arguing that the apparent success of some groups attracted others to emulate aspects of their approach, and perhaps also their ideology.¹⁵ Indeed, several early modern terrorists actually expressed the hope that they would set an example for others to emulate. As the Russian populist Nikolai Morozov observed in *The Terrorist Struggle*: "When a handful of people appears to represent the struggle of a whole nation and is triumphant over millions of enemies, then the idea of terroristic struggle will not die once it is clarified for the people and proven it can be practical."¹⁶ "Propaganda of the deed"—the very notion that acts of terrorism would be a better way to spread ideas than mere written propaganda—was based on the hope that terrorism would prove a contagious idea.¹⁷

The main causal mechanism in Rapoport's work, as in Huntington's, is historical context. The first Anarchist Wave emerged with new technological developments that made travel and communication easier, and in turn made it easier for ideas and doctrines to be transmitted across boundaries. In Rapoport's words: "A wave by definition is a historical event," sparked or shaped by international wars or peace agreements.¹⁸ Huntington was more explicit about the causes for waves of democratization: global economic growth, economic and military failure in dictatorships, changes in the policies of external actors (such as the superpowers), and a "snowballing effect" where early events provided models and inspiration for later events in the same wave.¹⁹ In both cases radical movements and organizations learn from their contemporaries, but the spread of both ideology and tactics is limited to a given time and space. A simple extension of this idea is that each wave of terrorism is characterized by a common narrative about the enemy—authoritarian monarchies, empires, capitalist democracies, and secular states—and a common international legal and

political regime—the concert of Europe, the age of empire, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War U.S.-dominated order of the 1990s. Indeed, the wave metaphor can even be extended to counter-terrorism strategies.²⁰

The central point about contagion or organizational learning is that it assigns more weight to the active role that terrorists and their organizations play in the process whereby ideas and practices “travel” across boundaries: much like Huntington’s dictators, terrorist groups sometimes cooperate with each other, and much more frequently learn from or imitate each other. The sociologists Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell examined a series of ways organizations can come to resemble each other (the process of *isomorphism*), including responding to similar conditions, learning from and imitating each other, and interacting with each other and establishing common norms.²¹ Although terrorist organizations are usually autonomous and isolated (even more so than dictators), and therefore less subject to pressure from society and competitors than many other organizations, it is clear that learning and copying have been important factors in shaping similarities across organizations both in terms of strategy and tactics.

There is a great deal of qualitative evidence in the historical record of the diffusion or transfer of ideas between different terrorist and insurgent actors, often across wide temporal and geographic distances. For example, the Irish revolutionary Michael Collins, who is often seen as one of the key architects of modern urban terrorism although he personally eschewed acts of indiscriminate violence,²² wrote an appreciative letter to the Boer commander Christiaan de Wet thanking him for being his “earliest inspiration.”²³ Collins also spoke of his admiration for the Finnish Nationalist Eugen Schauman, who assassinated the Russian Governor General of Finland, Nicholai Bobrikov, in 1904.²⁴ We also know from the Irish Nationalist O’Donovan Rossa’s private correspondence that he was well aware of the attempt by *Narodnaya Volya* to assassinate Tsar Alexander II by bombing the Winter Palace in February 1880.²⁵ President McKinley’s assassin, Leon Czolgosz, slept with a newspaper cutting about the assassination of King Umberto of Italy under his pillow, and even purchased the same model of Iver Johnson .32 revolver used by the Anarchist Gaetano Bresci for the assassination.²⁶ The Marxist Weather Underground Organization, which operated in the United States from 1969 to 1973, publicly declared the debt it owed to comrades elsewhere: “Now we are adapting the classic guerrilla strategy of the *Viet Cong* and the urban guerrilla strategy of the *Tupamaros* to our own situation here in the most technically advanced country in the world.”²⁷ The German Marxist Horst Mahler chose the name *Rote Armee Fraktion* in conscious homage to the Japanese Red Army (*Rengo Sekigun*).²⁸ Dimitris Koufodinas, Operations Chief of the Greek terror group November 17, taught himself Spanish in his prison cell so he could translate the prison memoirs of two *Tupamaros* leaders, Mauricio Rosencof and Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro.²⁹ Cutting deeply across time, Eldridge Cleaver, one of the leaders of the Black Panther Party in the late 1960s, adopted Sergei Nechaev’s nineteenth-century *Catechism of the Revolutionary* as his “revolutionary bible.”³⁰

Terrorists have emulated both groups they admire and their fiercest adversaries. The Indian Nationalist Barin Ghose, jailed for his role in a 1909 conspiracy to assassinate a member of the British government administration in Bengal, wrote that his “cult of violence” was “learnt from the Irish Seinfenners [sic] and Russian secret societies.”³¹ Hocine Ait Ahmet, the head of the Algerian *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties), analyzed the Irish struggle for independence, as well as the triumph of Communism in China and the tactics of the Viet Minh in Indochina.³² Yasser Arafat’s intelligence chief Salah Khalaf, better known to posterity by his *nom de guerre* Abu Iyad, noted in

his memoirs: "The guerrilla war in Algeria, launched five years before the creation of Fatah, had a profound influence on us . . . [It] symbolized the success we dreamed of."³³ The Al Qaeda ideologue Mustafa Setmariam Nasar—perhaps best known by his alias Abu Mus'ab al-Suri—employed the *nom de plume* "Castro."³⁴ Although he mourned the creation of the State of Israel, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb urged his fellow Islamists to learn from the success that the Jewish terrorist groups LEHI and *Irgun Zvi Leumi* had enjoyed influencing British policy in Palestine.³⁵ Arafat cited the relationship between the Haganah and Irgun as a model for the PLO–Fatah structure.³⁶ The French Organization of the Secret Army (OAS) formed in 1961 by disgruntled military veterans of the Algerian conflict was modeled on the image of its main adversary, the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN).³⁷

This kind of policy transfer can also take place directly, in the shape of training, even between what might seem at first sight to be ill-matched groups, such as the Japanese Red Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), who cooperated in the Bekaa Valley in the early 1970s.³⁸ Mia Bloom describes a "demonstration effect," whereby terrorist tactics spread from one conflict to another because perceived success attracts imitation. Bloom shows how the adoption of suicide bombing by the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas can be traced back to the December 1992 expulsion of 415 senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) activists from the Occupied Territories, to Marj al Zahour in Southern Lebanon.³⁹ Despite Hamas and PIJ both being Sunni organizations, the activists were taken in by the Shia Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah and provided with aid and operational training (including the use of explosives). Although many of those expelled from Israeli-controlled territory had been intellectuals and ideologues rather than frontline fighters, on their return to the Occupied Territories in September 1993 many took a more active part in hostilities and several were linked to suicide bombings by the Israeli authorities—a tactic that had not previously been used by Palestinian groups.⁴⁰ On October 19, 1994 Saleh al-Souwi boarded a bus in Tel Aviv carrying a bomb concealed in a brown bag that he then detonated, taking twenty-two civilian lives along with his own and injuring fifty others, making it the worst bomb attack in Israeli history up until that point. The following day a public announcement was read in mosques across the Gaza in which Hamas boasted that the attack had been carried out using knowledge and techniques learned directly from Hezbollah.⁴¹

In short, we know from both terrorists and analysts that terrorist groups actively and deliberately learn from each other. Not only ideology, but also strategy (elaboration of what a group's goal should be and how it is best pursued) and tactics (how to turn strategy into practice) are often shaped by other terrorists groups' experience. While direct learning, in the shape of training and support, might be limited to contemporary groups, it is clear that a number of terrorists have found inspiration in older groups or even adopted models from rival or opposing organizations. The next section proceeds to analyze the origins of modern terrorism, which go somewhat further back than Rapoport's first wave, and argues, as Lindsay Clutterbuck pointed out in his influential 2004 critique of Rapoport's article,⁴² that terrorism in the late nineteenth century had as much to do with Nationalism as with Anarchism.

The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Modern Terrorism

Terrorism has its origins in a series of technological developments that occurred almost simultaneously in the mid-nineteenth century. These have something in common with

the communications revolution at the end of the century that Rapoport emphasized, but a number of important developments preceded this by about half a century. The first was a revolution in military technology that concentrated the destructive power previously associated with mass military formations into the hands of a few individuals. Gunpowder had been the primary explosive in use for about 1000 years when in 1847 an Italian chemist called Ascanio Sobreno created nitroglycerine—a liquid compound that is eight times more powerful by weight than gunpowder. In its liquid form nitroglycerine proved immensely unstable and difficult to transport, but, after his brother Emil was killed in an industrial accident while working with nitroglycerine, Alfred Nobel began to experiment with methods of stabilizing the explosive and this led to his invention of dynamite, which he patented in 1867. Other key developments in weapons technology were the introduction of the revolver by Samuel Colt in 1835, the Orsini bomb (a hand-thrown contact grenade) designed and used by Felice Orsini for an assassination attempt on Emperor Napoleon III in 1858, the repeating rifle first manufactured by Christopher Spencer in 1860, and the so-called “horological torpedo,” a time delay bomb first deployed by the Confederate Secret Service in an attack on the Headquarters of Union General Ulysses S. Grant in City Point, Virginia, which killed more than fifty people in August 1864.⁴³ The sudden availability of powerful, affordable, portable, and concealable weapons—which could also be easily acquired or manufactured by private citizens—would prove to be a significant force multiplier for states and non-state actors alike.

The second development was the development of new mass communication technologies that allowed knowledge of ideas and events to be rapidly distributed across thousands of miles, and enabled individuals to travel easily across borders, and even across oceans, in larger numbers than ever before, opening up an era of mass migration and commensurate dislocation. The first working telegraph was built between Washington DC and Baltimore by Samuel Morse (who also developed Morse code to aid the transmission of messages), becoming operational in 1844. The laying of the first transatlantic telegraph cable was completed in 1858⁴⁴ and the use of the telegraph by the print media really took off in the 1860s when newspaper offices like *The Scotsman* and *The London Times* began to install telegraph lines in their newsrooms so that they could receive news rapidly from national capitals and overseas correspondents.⁴⁵ The steam-powered rotary printing press invented in the United States in 1843 allowed for the reproduction of millions of copies of pages of text in a single day.⁴⁶ On land, the world’s first commercial railway, the Stockton and Darlington Railway in England, began operation in 1825, the first railway in continental Europe opened in Belgium in 1835, and Russia got its first railway line in 1837, but the great expansion of railway networks occurred in the 1850s and 1860s as the individual national railway networks began to link up, offering passengers the possibility of traveling across Europe by rail. On sea, the construction of the iron-hulled *SS Great Western* by Isambard Kingdom Brunel in 1838 inaugurated the age of the trans-Atlantic passenger steamer, but it took the introduction of the screw propeller, iron hulls, and compound and triple expansion engines, which all combined to increase the size, fuel efficiency, and range of commercial vessels, to make trans-oceanic shipping economically viable on a large scale by 1870. German and Italian radicals like Johan Most and Luigi Galleani emigrated to the USA; Irish Americans based in urban centers like New York, Chicago, and Boston were able to fund terrorist activity on the British Mainland. Accordingly, some of the earliest modern terrorists—European Anarchists and Irish Nationalists—can be said to have posed a transnational threat almost from their inception.

The third and final revolution took place in the realm of ideas. Prior to the nineteenth century, political activity had been to all intents and purposes the exclusive province of social elites. New technologies brought access to educational opportunities that had not previously existed, agricultural laborers and artisans flocked to urban centers attracted by new employment opportunities and creating a new social class—the industrial proletariat. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Mikhail Bakunin, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and a host of others developed political theories that put the common man at the center of societal progress and created a language of working class empowerment. The German revolutionary Karl Heinzen was the first to articulate the use of violence, even mass murder, by individuals to effect political change in his influential 1853 pamphlet, *Mord und Freiheit*, coining the term *freiheits-kämpfer* or freedom fighter in the process.⁴⁷ The Europe-wide popular unrest of 1848 and the example set by the short-lived Paris Commune of 1871 held out hope to the disenfranchised that popular government by the masses was not beyond reach and that meaningful social change was possible. The mutiny of the Paris National Guard in March 1871 and the decision by the mutineers to hold an election, which led to the creation of a Socialist government that ruled Paris for three months, implementing a radical political agenda, would become a beacon of promise for social revolutionaries. The fact that the Paris Commune ended in a reactionary bloodbath that claimed more than twenty-five thousand lives as the French government reasserted control only strengthened their resolve, drawing the battle lines even more clearly. As the Swiss Anarchist Paul Brousse observed in an article in the radical journal *Bulletin de la Fédération Jurassienne*: “Prior to the Paris Commune, who in France was conversant with the principle of communal autonomy? No one.”⁴⁸ Afterwards it was an idea that resonated with the dispossessed and marginalized across the Western world.

The revolutionary ideals of the late nineteenth century were rooted as much in Nationalism as in revolutionary radicalism. Heinzen dedicated *Mord und Freiheit* to the Hungarian Nationalist Libényi János, who attempted to assassinate the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph I in February 1853. A few years earlier, in 1848, Mikhail Bakunin had penned an Appeal to the Slavs to rise up against the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the Balkans the “national sympathies” to which he appealed would eventually give rise to one of the most active and enduring early terrorist organizations, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), as well as one of the most consequential terrorist attacks of all time—the assassination in Sarajevo of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by the Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip in June 1914, which precipitated the outbreak of World War I. Princip was explicit about his motivation, declaring at his trial: “I am a Yugoslav Nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be freed from Austria.”⁴⁹ The cause of Italian reunification was also the motivating force behind Felice Orsini’s assassination attempt on Napoleon III, and the pivotal role played by Giuseppe Garibaldi and his 1,000 red shirts in the Italian *Risorgimento* was hugely influential on other revolutionary movements, as it demonstrated that a small group of determined men could have a decisive impact on the affairs of great powers. The leading Italian Anarchist Errico Malatesta acknowledged the debt he and his followers owed to the heroes of the *Risorgimento*, noting that the First International taught its members nothing that had not already been learned from Orsini, Mazzini, and Garibaldi.⁵⁰ This was certainly Orsini’s intention; he published two volumes of memoirs and a number of political pamphlets

based on his career as a revolutionary during his lifetime, including one with an appendix entitled “How to Conspire.”⁵¹

In Europe, the revolutions of 1848–49 and the Paris Commune raised the hopes of a range of radical groups that social change might be achieved, but some individuals and groups concluded from these events (together with the failed efforts of Russian populists to educate and mobilize the rural population in the 1870s) that more dramatic action—terrorism—would be required. In the USA, the tensions surrounding the Civil War played a similar role. In Europe, radicals that were on the losing side in 1848–49 and 1871 turned to terrorism; in the USA it was the opponents of slavery before the outbreak of the Civil War (John Brown), and many on the losing side afterwards (the Ku Klux Klan). In Europe this gave rise to Anarchist and Nationalist terrorism in the second half of the nineteenth century; in the USA it gave rise to Religious and Exclusivist terrorism.

The nineteenth century brought together the means, the motive, and the opportunity for small bands of committed radicals to take the fight to the established order and men and women of all political stripes were quick to realize the game-changing tools that the march of science had placed in the hands of their followers. Rapoport dates his first wave of terrorism as beginning in the 1880s, but as early as the 1850s and 1860s we can see Nationalists, populists (perhaps a more accurately inclusive label for the disparate “old left” groups of Rapoport’s “first wave” than Anarchism), Exclusionists, and Religious extremists begin to explore the possibilities that these new tools had to offer. The “patients zero” of this viral metaphor, as best we have been able to establish, are the Italian Nationalist Felice Orsini, the German populist Karl Heinzen, the former Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest, and the American abolitionist John Brown.

Nationalist Terrorism—From Felice Orsini to the Tamil Tigers

Felice Orsini was an associate of the Italian statesman Giuseppe Mazzini and a supporter of Italian unification, to which Napoleon III was perceived as an obstacle. In a transnational conspiracy, which saw Orsini build and test a contact bomb of his own devising in England before traveling to Paris, Orsini and his Italian co-conspirators planned to bomb the Emperor’s coach as he drove to the opera on the evening of January 14, 1858. Three “Orsini” bombs, employing fulminate of mercury as an explosive, detonated, killing and injuring a number of onlookers in the crowd but leaving Napoleon and his entourage essentially unharmed. Injured in the blasts, Orsini was detained before he could make good his escape and was ultimately sent to the guillotine.⁵²

In the end, Italy’s path to unification would be driven in large part by the actions of regular and irregular forces, rather than clandestine groups, and the torch of Nationalist terrorism would be taken up by Irish Nationalists based in the United States who launched a violent assault on the major cities of the British mainland in the 1880s. The campaign was eight years in the making. In the autumn of 1875 Patrick Ford, the editor of the Brooklyn-based newspaper *Irish World*, and his brother Augustine, both passionate supporters of Irish independence, had first developed the idea of dispatching what they termed “skirmishers” from the United States to undermine British rule in Ireland.⁵³ Patrick explained his plan in the pages of *Irish World*: “The Irish cause requires skirmishers. It requires a little band of heroes who will initiate and keep up without intermission a guerilla warfare—men who will

fly over the land and sea like invisible beings—now striking the enemy in Ireland, now in India, now in England itself, as occasion may present.”⁵⁴ The use of skirmishers had attracted significant attention during the American Civil War as a result of a series of influential articles written by General John Watts de Peyster under the title “New American Tactics.” Using their newspaper as a platform, the Fords joined with the Irish Nationalist leader Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa to establish a “Skirmishing Fund” to raise money for their plan, and it was the revenue from this fund (re-named the National Fund in 1878) that would be used to fund operations of the Irish secret society *Clan Na Gael* (Family of Gaels) operations, as well as additional attacks by “skirmishers” working directly for Rossa. Between 1881 and 1887 the so-called “Dynamite Campaign” saw high-profile targets in London like Tower Bridge, Scotland Yard, the Palace of Westminster, and the new Underground rail system come under attack—one bomb that detonated on the Metropolitan line injured seventy-two people, mostly third class passengers.⁵⁵ There were further bombings in Manchester, Liverpool, and Glasgow.

Irish Nationalist terrorist groups would come and go over the next 130 years. As President of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, Adjutant-General of the Irish Volunteers, and Director of Information of the shadow Nationalist government, Michael Collins led an urban guerrilla campaign that played a crucial role in securing the independence of the southern twenty-six counties of Ireland in 1921. The success of Collins and his tactics inspired national liberation movements around the world. As the leader of Jewish terrorist group LEHI, future Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir adopted “Michael” as his *nom de guerre* in explicit homage to Michael Collins.⁵⁶ Further outbreaks of Irish Nationalist violence—focused on securing a British withdrawal from the remaining six counties of Northern Ireland—would occur during the Second World War, the late 1950s and early 1960s, and for three decades from the 1970s to the 1990s, featuring such groups as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Provisional IRA, and the Irish National Liberation Army.⁵⁷ Fringe Nationalist groups like the Real IRA and the Continuity Army Council continue to reject the Northern Ireland Peace Process to this day, with the most recent fatal attack at the time of writing, the murder of Prison Officer David Black, occurring as recently as November 2012.

The Nationalist strain of the terrorist virus can be tracked spreading across the globe far beyond Ireland. A shortlist of other prominent Nationalist terrorist groups would include the Indian Barin Ghose and the Maniktala group fighting British rule in the first decades of the twentieth century, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) active in the same period, Zionist extremist groups like Irgun and LEHI fighting the British Mandate or their Arab counterparts, the Black Hand founded by Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, the Algerian *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN), active against French Colonial rule from 1954 to 1962, the Greek Cypriot group *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* (EOKA—the National Organization of Cypriot Struggle) who fought the British from 1955 to 1959, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), active in Sri Lanka from 1976 to 2009, and finally the Palestinian group Fateh founded in the late 1950s and still active today.⁵⁸ It is important to note that many of these groups, if not directly responsible for securing independence for their people, have become an important, if not crucial, part of their nations’ independence narratives—inspiring further emulation. The chain of Nationalist terrorism stretches unbroken from the 1880s to the present day.

Socialist Terrorism—From Karl Heinzen to ETA

While Karl Heinzen did not himself convert words into deeds, he helped inspire a generation of populists, Socialists, and Anarchists that would put his program into action. His influence was such that two days after Leon Czolgosz assassinated U.S. President William McKinley in September 1901, Johan Most reprinted Karl Heinzen's essay *Der Mord*, written almost fifty years earlier, to provide political context to the incident—a gesture that earned him a conviction in the New York courts for willfully and wrongfully endangering the public peace.⁵⁹ Marx and Engels were also well acquainted with Heinzen's work—with Engels in particular going out of his way to disparage Heinzen in the British press.⁶⁰

It was another associate of Marx and Engels, the Russian Anarchist philosopher Mikhail Bakunin, who, working with a radical Russian student Sergei Nechaev, helped to lay the foundation for one of the first leftist terror groups, Nechaev's *Narodnaya Rasprava* (The People's Retribution), briefly active in 1869. *Narodnaya Rasprava* would partially inspire the creation of a far better organized clandestine populist group, *Narodnaya Volya*, in 1879.⁶¹ It was *Narodnaya Volya* that succeeded in assassinating Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Leftist terrorism would continue in Russia until the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution, and it is worth recalling that Lenin's elder brother, Aleksander, was executed in 1887 because of his association with a *Narodnaya Volya* plot to kill Tsar Alexander III. Anarchist terrorism would become a worldwide phenomenon. In September 1883 a ring of conspirators, led by the self-described Anarchist-Communist Kamerad Reinsdorf, only narrowly failed to blow up Kaiser Wilhelm I and the "Iron Chancellor" Otto von Bismarck.⁶² As Rapoport notes, the 1890s would see the assassination of the King of Italy, the Prime Minister of Spain, the President of France, and Empress Elizabeth of Austria. Anarchist groups detonated bombs across Western Europe and the United States, with major attacks taking place as far afield as Paris (1892 and 1894), Barcelona (1893 and 1896), London (1894), Milwaukee (1917), New York (1920), and Milan (1921). As late as 1928, Bhagat Singh of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association (HSRA), who was heavily influenced by the thinking of Mikhail Bakunin,⁶³ gunned down Assistant Superintendent John Saunders as a reprisal for the violent suppression of a public demonstration in Lahore by Colonial police. In deliberate emulation of the nineteenth-century French Anarchist Auguste Valliant, Singh followed the attack on Saunders by hurling two small bombs onto the floor of the Central Legislative Assembly in New Delhi while the chamber was in session.⁶⁴

To all intents and purposes, Rapoport's third wave of "New Left" terrorism is really just the uninterrupted evolution of the "Old Left" activity he groups together as his first wave. In Russia, the Social Revolutionary Party picked up the thread from *Narodnaya Volya* after the repression of student rebellions at the turn of the century, and again after the aborted revolution of 1905–06,⁶⁵ and many of the practitioners of terrorism on the left lent their skills to the new regime's "Red Terror" after the 1917 revolution.⁶⁶ The Communist International (or Comintern) became at the same time the instrument and the victim of Stalin's terror outside Russia.⁶⁷ The lessons Mao Tse Tung derived from fighting both the invading Imperial Japanese Army and the Chinese Nationalist Army of Chiang Kai-shek in the late 1930s led to the formulation of his doctrine of People's War that would deeply inform the activities of groups like the Red Army Faction, Shining Path, and the Red Brigades, as well as shaping the work of other key theorists of irregular warfare and urban guerrilla combat such

as Régis Debray, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, and Carlos Marighella. The concept of armed propaganda developed by the Tupamaros was really just a restatement of the idea of propaganda of the deed first articulated by Bakunin, and popularized by Paul Brousse, in the 1870s. The heyday of New Left terrorism may have been in the 1970s and 1980s, but some of the same groups still remain active and their example continues to exert influence to this day. Michael Ryan, author of *Decoding Al Qaeda's Strategy*, even wryly notes: “Al Qaeda’s strategic writings may begin and end with Islamic references and prayers but their core arguments have less to do with Islam than with the texts of Communist insurgents and ideologues.”⁶⁸ People’s War theory also heavily influenced Nationalist groups like the Provisional IRA, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Basque Separatist group *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA), which all shared a Marxist sensibility.⁶⁹

Religious Terrorism—From John Brown to Al Qaeda

In May 1856, the American abolitionist John Brown, a militant opponent of slavery in the southern United States, rode into the pro-slavery Kansas settlement Pottawatomie with his small group of followers and pulled five members of the pro-slavery Law and Order Party from their beds and brutally executed them. Motivated by his profound Christian faith, Brown’s avowed intent was to “make an example, and so strike terror” in the hopes of stampeding proslavery civilians into leaving the Kansas territory.⁷⁰ When Brown led his raid on the federal armory in Harpers Ferry in October 1859 he hoped—like so many of the men and women of violence that would come after him—his small band would inspire others to rise up by their example and take back their freedom using the weapons from the armory. Brown and his men seized the armory and took thirty-five local inhabitants hostage. The hoped-for uprising did not transpire and a federal force—ironically enough led by the future Confederate Commander-in-Chief Robert E. Lee—captured Brown, killed ten of his men, including two of his sons, and freed their hostages. Brown was swiftly put on trial, which he used as platform to proclaim his views, and then executed. As befitted a man who had admonished his followers “to take more care to end life well than to live long,”⁷¹ Brown went to scaffold quite cheerfully, embracing martyrdom. Max Boot has described Brown as “one of the more consequential terrorists in history,” quoting Frederick Douglass’ epitaph: “If John Brown did not end the war that ended slavery, he did at least begin the war that ended slavery.”⁷² Henry David Thoreau said of his execution: “Some eighteen hundred years ago, Christ was crucified; This morning, perchance, Captain Brown was hung.... He is not Old Brown any longer; he is an angel of light.”⁷³

The religious strain lay dormant for more than half a century before emerging once more, but in the interim religious belief certainly impacted other strains. For example, Walter Laqueur traces many of the important ideas about justifiable tyrannicide in Anarchist and early Nationalist terrorism to Christian thought, even though terrorists like Heinzen emphasized the distinction between the two doctrines.⁷⁴ Religion was an important factor in Irish Nationalism—with the Easter Uprising in 1916, Pádraig Pearse and his confederates explicitly set out to establish what he termed “a theology of insurrection” and the choice of Easter Monday for the rising was also deliberate in this regard, with its connotations of sacrifice and resurrection.⁷⁵ The action of the British authorities only served to amplify this effect. As the

Provisional IRA intelligence officer Eamon Collins would write more than eighty years later: "In my mind, Pearse and [James] Connolly were all linked together. They were martyrs for our Catholic faith, the true religion: religion and politics fused together by the blood of the martyrs. I was prepared to be martyr, to die for this Catholic faith."⁷⁶ The American Marxist terror group the Weather Underground would also later name one of its publications *Osawatomie*, after a town in Kansas that John Brown had tried to defend against pro-Slavery raiders in 1856.⁷⁷

The first modern Islamist revival movement, the Society of the Muslim Brothers or Muslim Brotherhood, would reactivate the strain by putting faith at the heart of politics. Founded in Egypt in March 1928, the central virtues of the Muslim Brotherhood's philosophy were militancy (within the context of jihad) and martyrdom.⁷⁸ The group's semi-autonomous military wing, known as *al-jihaz* (the Secret Apparatus), carried out terrorist attacks against Egyptian government figures, British military targets in the Suez Canal Zone, and businesses considered emblematic of unwelcome Western influence such as cinemas and nightclubs.⁷⁹ The Brotherhood even sent volunteers to fight in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. For the Society's founder, a former school teacher called Hasan al-Banna, martyrdom was the apogee of political struggle: "The supreme martyrdom is only conferred on those who slay or are slain in the way of God. As death is inevitable and can happen only once, partaking in jihad is profitable in this world and the next."⁸⁰ The Society of Muslim Brothers was forcibly disbanded by the Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud an-Nukrashi Pasha in early December 1948. When an-Nukrashi was assassinated by a student member of the Brotherhood just three weeks later, Hasan al-Banna was gunned down on a street in Cairo by the Egyptian Secret Police in retaliation.⁸¹

Hasan al-Banna's place was taken by a former school inspector and public intellectual, Sayyid Qutb, who joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1953. Qutb's most successful work, *Milestones*, maps out an uncompromising program for advancing the Islamist cause: "Preaching alone is not enough to establish the dominion of Allah on earth. . . . Those who have usurped the authority of Allah and are oppressing Allah's creatures are not going to give up their power merely through preaching."⁸² When the Egyptian government became aware of Qutb's role in helping to reestablish the Muslim Brotherhood on a clandestine basis, he was arrested, sentenced to death, and executed in August 1966. His biographer John Calvert compares *Milestones* to Lenin's similarly influential *What Is to Be Done?*⁸³ Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who led the political movement *Hizb-i Islami* against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the late 1970s and 1980s, and Shaykh Salamat Hashim, former leader of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, publicly credited Qutb as their inspiration.⁸⁴ Osama bin Laden attended public lectures given by Qutb's brother, Muhammad, at King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, and his successor as leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman Al Zawahiri, was raised on tales of Qutb's piety and vision by his uncle Mahfouz Azzam, Qutb's personal lawyer and the executor of his will.⁸⁵

The Muslim Brotherhood would become the inspiration for a number of more recent Islamist terrorist organizations. Ayman Al Zawahiri published a study of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1991 entitled *The Bitter Harvest*, which, though critical, also illustrates the conceptual debt Al Qaeda owes the Brotherhood.⁸⁶ The Muslim Brotherhood's unique combination of militancy and social service provision has also been widely copied, including by terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Service provision creates its own dynamic, strengthening bonds between armed groups and their constituents, but also creates obligations. As the Deputy Secretary-General

of Hezbollah, Naim Qassem, explained in his memoirs: “Social work serves to enrich supporters’ confidence in the viability of the Party’s causes and course, as it cooperates, collaborates and joins forces to remain strong and tenacious in its political and resistance roles.”⁸⁷

Rapoport dates the beginning of his fourth Religious Wave to the upheavals that gripped the Muslim world in 1979—a pivotal year certainly, which as he notes saw the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by radical followers of Mohammed Abdullah al-Qahtani—but it is clear that the seeds of the Islamic revival go back much, much further. Of course it should be stressed that religious terrorism is not an exclusively Islamic phenomenon. Rapoport notes the violence of the Christian Identity movement in the United States in the 1990s, Jewish terrorism against the Israeli secular government, and Sikh terrorism in the 1980s; to which one could also add the rising tide of Buddhist violence directed at the Muslim population of Burma and the role the Jewish faith played in the legitimizing narratives of both Irgun and LEHI in the 1930s and 1940s.⁸⁸

Social Exclusion Terrorism—From Nathan Forrest to Anders Behring Breivik

The Confederate States of America had been one of the first governments to grasp the potential that the nineteenth-century revolution in military capabilities represented. In 1863, Bernard Janin Sage published a pamphlet titled *Organization of Private Warfare* promoting the use of irregular bands of “destructionists,” which he conceived as operating under loose official direction on land much as privateers operated at sea, in such a way that the Confederacy could “do the most harm with the least expense to ourselves.”⁸⁹ The pamphlet influenced the creation of the Confederate Bureau of Special and Secret Service, which was behind the attack on Grant’s headquarters. Confederate “bush-whackers” like William Quantrill engaged Unionist troops along the Missouri-Kansas border in highly mobile irregular warfare and later morphed into criminal incarnations such as the James-Younger Gang (of Jesse James fame). There is evidence of collusion between veterans of both Quantrill’s raiders and the James-Younger gang, and one of the most active early Ku Klux Klan “dens” in Alamance County, North Carolina. Although he was not a founding member of the Klan—that dubious honor fell to six young Confederate veterans in Pulaski, Tennessee—the Confederate Cavalry General Nathan Bedford Forrest would be the first leader of the Klan in its mature political and activist form.⁹⁰ The racism that underpinned the institution of slavery, and thus inevitably the Confederate cause, gave rise to the Ku Klux Klan around which opposition and resistance to the Unionist reconstruction of the south coalesced. During the eleven years of reconstruction from 1865–1876, the Klan killed an estimated 3,000 freed former slaves and brutally intimidated Black communities from realizing any semblance of equality. The failure of the federal government to intervene to secure the 1875 election in Mississippi with predictable consequences for Black voters led its Republican Governor, Adelbert Ames, to proclaim in disgust: “A revolution has taken place (by force of arms) and a race are disenfranchised—they are to be returned to a condition of serfdom.”⁹¹ The Ku Klux Klan had snatched no small measure of victory from the jaws of defeat. Although reconstruction was abandoned in 1876, the Klan’s racially motivated violence would continue for more than a century spawning beatings, lynchings, bombings, and assassinations. This violence attracted little attention outside the

southern United States until the 1960s, and as such it exerted little influence on political developments further afield, but the Klan might nevertheless be reasonably described as the first modern terrorist organization.

However, the Klan is far from the only Exclusionist terrorist organization to ply its trade around the world. In Russia the anti-Semitic underground movement known as the Black Hundreds assassinated two Jewish members of the Russian Duma in 1906 and launched a series of pogroms against Jewish communities in the Ukraine in the years before the outbreak of World War I. In the 1920s Germany saw the emergence of the Nazi party's *Sturmabteilung* (the SA, or Stormtroopers), a paramilitary organization that used terrorism in support of the political party (which included its own internal body responsible for terror in the shape of the *Shutzstaffel*—the SS) and merits its inclusion in books on terrorism.⁹² Walter Laqueur includes the German *Freikorps*, and Hungarian and Romanian fascists among Right Wing terrorist groups that attacked political leaders: the Iron Guard killed two Romanian prime ministers in the 1930s.⁹³ French settler violence was an important factor in the Algerian War of Independence. On August 10, 1956 a former French intelligence officer, André Achary, supported by members of the Union Française Nord-Africaine, planted a large bomb in Thèbes Road, Algiers, which exploded killing 73 local Muslim residents and helped precipitate the Battle of Algiers. The disaffected French military personnel of the OAS even attempted a military coup, and tried to assassinate President Charles de Gaulle on several occasions.⁹⁴ As Michael Burleigh notes, the OAS was actually responsible for more deaths than the entire Northern Ireland conflict.⁹⁵ The activities of the Italian Red Brigades in the 1970s were met by a strong counter-reaction from the Italian extreme Right and groups like Black Order, Revolutionary Fascist Nuclei, and New Order: 6 people were killed when a bomb exploded in 1970 on the *Freccia del Sud* express train connecting Milan with Palermo; 8 were killed by a bomb planted in a union meeting at the *Piazza della Loggia* in Brescia and 12 in a train bombing in Italicus near Bologna in 1974.⁹⁶ Neo-fascist terrorism reached a climax in August 1980 when 84 people were killed and 200 wounded in a bomb blast at Bologna train station. The Right-Wing backlash in Italy was also echoed in Germany with the bombing of the Munich Oktoberfest in September 1980 by the neo-Nazi Gundolf Köhler, in which 13 people were killed (including Köhler) and 211 injured.⁹⁷

In 2011, the Southern Poverty Law Center published a list of more than 100 “plots, conspiracies and racist rampages” that had occurred in the United States since the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing committed by White Supremacist Timothy McVeigh, which itself claimed 168 lives.⁹⁸ In December 2008, police investigating the murder of James G. Cummings in Belfast, Maine, discovered that he had been in the process of assembling a homemade dirty bomb. Cummings, a White Supremacist and an ardent admirer of Adolf Hitler, was reportedly “very upset” about the election of President Barack Obama.⁹⁹ A similarly disturbing incident occurred in April 2003 when federal investigators stumbled across an arms cache assembled by 63-year-old White Supremacist William Krar, which included 800 grams of sodium cyanide—enough to kill thousands of people.¹⁰⁰ As recently as June 2015, twenty-one-year-old White Supremacist Dylann Roof walked into a church in Charleston, South Carolina, and shot dead nine African-American worshippers, telling one of his victims: “You rape our women and you’re taking over our country. And you have to go.”¹⁰¹

Other contemporary examples of this strain would include the British neo-Nazi David Copeland, who detonated three nail bombs targeting immigrant and gay

communities in London over a thirteen-day period in April 1999, claiming 3 lives and maiming dozens more. There is also of course the Norwegian racist Anders Behring Breivik, who on July 22, 2011 detonated a 950 kilogram nitrate fertilizer bomb concealed in a white Volkswagen van parked outside government buildings in Oslo, killing 8 people and injuring 9 seriously. He then traveled to a Labor Party youth camp on the island of Utøya, where he shot dead 69 campers and wounded 33.¹⁰² Breivik later stated that one of the reasons he had specifically chosen the island as a target was that the former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland had been scheduled to speak there, but she had already left Utøya by the time he arrived. He claimed to be acting on behalf of a fictitious “Knights Templar” organization and published a manifesto setting out his anti-Socialist and xenophobic beliefs online before the attacks. This was the worst violent incident in Norway since the Second World War, and commentators estimated that 1 in 4 Norwegians knew someone personally affected by the attacks. Overt or tacit racism is also an important aspect of delegitimizing and dehumanizing narratives in conflicts driven by religious or Nationalist sentiments.

Conclusion—The Four Horsemen Ride

Rapoport’s *Four Waves of Modern Terrorism* is the field of terrorism studies’ equivalent of Francis Fukuyama’s essay “The End of History.” It is thought provoking and conceptually useful. However, while at first glance it seems to fit the facts, the reality is messier and more prosaic. There are no waves of modern terrorism—there are simply numerous situations around the world where the means, motive, and opportunity to seek political change through violence have given rise to terrorist actors motivated by one or more of the four strains outlined above.

The truth is that we are living in an age of terrorism, and have been for a century and a half. Modern terrorism is a product of the dramatic changes in weapons technology and mass communications in the nineteenth century and the development of radical ideologies that inspired revolutionary groups to experiment with new forms of political violence. The four strains of modern terrorism all have their roots in this confluence of means and motive. Technological and ideational developments made modern terrorism, technological and ideological change drove developments in the four strains during the twentieth century, and technological and ideological change is likely to shape their future trajectories.

Terrorist groups come in many shapes and sizes, and they evolve and mutate. Jessica Stern coined the phrase “the Protean enemy”—after the shape-shifting Greek sea god featured in Homer’s *Odyssey*—to describe the challenge posed by terrorism because of the constantly changing nature of the groups involved and the changing nature of the threat itself.¹⁰³ Terrorism is not, and will never be, a conceptually clean label. As Rapoport has noted, terrorists are complex actors that may simultaneously inhabit multiple identities¹⁰⁴—terrorist and drug trafficker, terrorist and freedom fighter, terrorist and revolutionary, Marxist and Nationalist—but at their core all the groups featured in this article have one thing in common: they are prepared to indiscriminately and violently target civilians for political gain.

The four strains differ fundamentally in ideology. Some of the organizations cited in this article used terrorism as one of several tactics, but for many, terrorism became their central, defining characteristic: a strategy that defined what their goals were and how these were to be achieved. There is ample evidence that they have

learned from each other. Judging by what the terrorists themselves claim, contagion (or learning) seems to have been somewhat stronger within each strain, than across strains. But it must also be acknowledged that in many cases ideas jumped across both generations and ideologies.

All four strains have proven resilient, despite the ideological and technological revolutions of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Today, in some respects, the social and political space in which to operate as a terrorist actor is shrinking. For example, emerging technologies like facial recognition, social media, robotics, predictive algorithms, artificial intelligence, and genetic marking will make it harder and harder for individuals or small groups to operate off the grid. In other respects, with the rise of failed states and the “feral cities” that counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen warns of in *Out of the Mountains*, their space to operate might be increasing.¹⁰⁵ The question about the future threat of terrorism is not so much whether and when a new wave might emerge, as how changing geopolitics, ideology, and technology might affect each of the four strains and whether they might mutate into new forms of political violence.

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Notes

1. The article appeared in three versions: David C. Rapoport, “The Fourth Wave: September 11 and the History of Terrorism,” *Current History* 100, no. 650 (2001): 419–24; “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” *Anthropoetics* 8, no. 1 (2002); “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James Ludes, eds., *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73.

2. See, e.g., David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, eds., *Terrorism Studies: A Reader* (London: Routledge, 2012).

3. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); “Democracy’s Third Wave,” *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2 (1991): 12–34.

4. See also Rapoport’s earlier work along similar lines: David C. Rapoport, “Introduction,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 10, no. 4 (1987): 1–10; and “Sacred Terror: A Contemporary Example from Islam,” in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).

5. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism” (see note 1 above), 47.

6. Lindsay Clutterbuck was one of the first to refute this argument by outlining the critical role played by Irish Nationalist groups like Clan Na Gael and The Skirmishers in the development of terrorist practice in the nineteenth century. See Lindsay Clutterbuck, “The Progenitors of Terrorism: Russian Revolutionaries or Extreme Irish Republicans?” *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 1 (2004): 154–81.

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9. *Ibid.*, 48.

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61. Deborah Hardy, *Land and Freedom: The Origins of Russian Terrorism, 1976–1979* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), chapter 5.
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