Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the Terrorist Movements They Oppose

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Terrorist groups have yet to attract the same level of academic interest as other social movement organizations (SMOs), although they are well suited to the analytical approach pioneered by Ted Gurr, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. Social constructivism offers a valuable frame with which to assess state responses to terrorism. Carlos Marighela argued that one of the principal goals of the urban guerrilla was to goad the state into a spasm of overreaction that would undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. This article takes Marighela's concept one step further, arguing that by adopting repressive counterterrorism policies, democratic states "socially construct" more resilient, more aggressive terrorist organizations. Like Hercules' antagonist Antaeas in Greek mythology, terrorist groups draw their strength from their surrounding environment. Successful counterterrorism strategies erode popular support for terrorism and unsuccessful ones contribute to it. This paper examines the experiences of five democratic states— the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Italy, and Israel—from this perspective and concludes that when confronting terrorism, the greatest challenge of all is to adopt and maintain a measured response to terrorist outrages.

Keywords frame amplication, precipitating incident, relative deprivation, social movement organization, state construction

In *The Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*, the Brazilian communist Carlos Marighela explicitly encouraged terrorist groups to mount attacks designed to provoke state authorities into overreaction.[1] Marighela theorized that a repressive state response would alienate the government from its population and generate support for the terrorists, that declining governmental legitimacy would strengthen the terrorist cause. If Marighela's theory is correct, one would expect to see a correlation between a draconian state response and both the resilience and intensity of terrorist campaigns. This paper tests Marighela's theory against the experiences of five democratic states which have confronted significant domestic terrorist threats. I aim to

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demonstrate that, in democratic states at least, the resilience of terrorist movements and the intensity of their operations can ultimately be put down to a process of "state construction,"[2] and that democratic states confronting terrorism have the potential to be, quite literally, their own worst enemies.

As Charles Tilly warns in his paper "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists," "terrorism" is not a single causally coherent phenomenon and those who utilize "terror" hardly form a coherent class of actors.[3] Attempts at an all encompassing definition inevitably result in a pool of actors and scenarios too diffuse to allow for meaningful, parsimonious research.[4] Instead researchers have tended to seek to limit the term by advancing tighter, more constrained, working definitions of their own. Such conceptual definitions of terrorism typically revolve around such issues as the nature of the actors involved, their motivation in using violence, the type of coercion applied, and the non-combatant status of its target.[5] For the purposes of this paper, I will use a definition popularized by Boaz Ganor: "Terrorism is the intentional use of or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims."[6] By "counterterrorism" I mean state action to thwart further terrorist attacks, not the state adoption of terror tactics—a formulation sometimes used by academics in this field.

The comparative case studies I have selected are all drawn from the experiences of the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Italy, and Israel. To counter suggestions of selective bias in this most similar systems design, I have deliberately included two conspicuous cases in which the use of an emblematically repressive measure appears to have succeeded: Canada's invocation of the War Measures Act in 1970 to combat the *Front de Libération du Québec* (FLQ) and the use of internment by the British government during the IRA's 1956–1963 cross-border campaign. I have selected states with significantly different cultural attitudes towards the use of coercive power by the state and have chosen conflicts which reflect elements of at least three of the "four waves" of terrorism identified by David Rapoport—"the anti-colonial wave" (national liberation movements), "the New Left wave" (revolutionary Marxism), and "the religious wave" (Islamic extremism).[7] I have also opted to use two sequential, yet apparently contrary, examples from the Northern Ireland conflict.

> "*Revolutionary movements are largely artifacts or products of historically contingent political contexts.*"[8]

To analyze the impact counterterrorist measures can have on the evolution of a specific conflict, one must first have some understanding of the forces motivating terrorist organizations to adopt such violent tactics in the first place. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, a number of scholars have moved to adapt their research on insurgencies and revolutionary movements to glean insights into the nature of the terrorist threat.[9] Terrorism shares many of the characteristics of revolutionary activity,[10] it is a relatively modern phenomenon,[11] and the state lies at the centre of terrorist demands.[12] The emergence of terrorist groups can in part be understood with reference to the four classic social movement organization (SMO) concepts: political opportunity, mobilizing structures, collective action frames, and repertoires of contention.[13] However, terrorist frames no more "drop from the sky" than do revolutionary ideologies, social networks, or material resources.[14] Oppositional social movements may be generated in part by domestic concerns, such as social injustice (Gurr and Snyder),[15] or by external factors, such as modernization (Huntington and Tilly),[16] or military threat (Skocpol),[17] but they are all ultimately

socially constructed in opposition to state authority and so there is an inescapable sense in which the state itself must play a role in their creation.

The origins of this state-centered approach lie in Ted Gurr's seminal work, *Why Men Rebel* (1970). At the heart of Gurr's theory of political violence is the concept of "relative deprivation," which he describes as the "perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and value capabilities."[18] Political violence is therefore conceptualized as a specific kind of response to specific conditions of social existence.[19] The level of relative deprivation impacts directly on the political legitimacy of a given regime.[20] Political actors—states and elites—are held responsible, by their errors of commission or omission, for any perceived deprivation and their legitimacy suffers as a result.[21] Gurr builds on this insight to develop a theory regarding the use of coercion by states and elites. He starts from the assumption that "the use of coercion in the service of any collective purpose tends to antagonize and increase the resistance of those against whom it is directed."[22] He argues that repressive measures to curb political violence—especially those randomly, inequitably, or inconsistently applied—introduced in the absence of meaningful reform are ultimately only likely to exacerbate the potential for further violence.[23]

Most analysts would not go quite as far as Gurr in claiming that "no pattern of coercive control, however intense and consistent, is likely to deter permanently all enraged men from violence, except genocide."[24] The resource mobilization model popularized by Doug McAdam in *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* (1982) suggests that an extremely repressive "closed" regime, such as the Brezhnev-era Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, will choke off any opportunity for oppositional groups to engage in collective action.[25] This was certainly the experience in 1970s Latin America, where military leaders in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile swept aside democratically-elected governments in order to bring the maximum coercive force to bear on would-be Marxist revolutionaries.[26] According to McAdam, belief in the likelihood of success and the availability of political opportunities are key components of successful group mobilization,[27] which are lacking in an extremely repressive climate. Some quantitative-oriented researchers of elite coercive capability and mass violence such as Douglas Hibbs have fallen into the trap of equating the coercive capability of a given state with military expenditure, or the ratio of internal security forces to the population at large, or number of such forces found per 1,000 sq km of territory,[28] while ignoring political, social, and legal constraints on the use of that power.[29] It is my contention that defeating terrorist groups rarely just comes down to the number of boots on the ground.

The Argentine general Luciano Menéndez notoriously declared himself prepared to kill 50,000 people—25,000 subversives, 20,000 sympathizers, and 5,000 unfortunate innocents—to defeat the People's Revolutionary Army and the Montoneros.[30] The introduction of such "extremely repressive" measures is simply not an option open to democratic states characterized as they are by the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and a foundation of basic civil rights. Thus democratic states seeking to clamp down on the political opportunities open to terrorist groups tend to resort to authoritarian half-measures—such as the limited use of preventative detention, coercive interrogation techniques, and the occasional use of lethal force—creating an environment in which the regime's legitimacy is damaged in the eyes of supporters and opponents alike, while oppositional social organization is still possible and the cost of collective action is not yet prohibitive.[31]

In *No Other Way Out* (2001), Jeff Goodwin builds on this insight, arguing that "certain state structures and practices actively form or 'construct' revolutionary movements as effectively as the best professional revolutionaries, by channeling and organizing political dissent along radical lines."[32] State constructivism theory emphasizes how the actions of the state make "cognitively plausible and morally justifiable" both grievances and grievance-based responses.[33] Goodwin does not discount the role of agency nor of larger societal processes, but argues instead that it is the nature of the state response to the challenge to its authority that frames the subsequent evolution of the conflict: "Violent, exclusionary regimes tend to foster unintentionally the hegemony or dominance of their most radical social critics."[34] Goodwin's view receives tacit support from Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly's *Dynamics of Contention* (2001), which considers the creation of new actors and identities through the very process of contention to be one (albeit not the only one) of the common mechanisms driving social conflict forward.[35]

> "*What is at issue is not merely the presence and absence of grievances, but the manner in which grievances are interpreted and the generation and diffusion of those interpretations.*"[36]

Terrorism can most usefully be conceptualized as an extreme form of political dialogue, one evocatively termed "propaganda by deed" by nineteenth century anarchist and social revolutionary groups.[37] Terrorist acts are "value laden"[38] and form part of a narrative of communication between the terrorist group, its perceived client audience, and the target state and its supporters.[39] Tilly suggests that each act of terrorist violence signifies to these audiences that the target is vulnerable, that the perpetrators exist, and that the perpetrators have the capacity to strike again.[40] It logically follows that any state response inevitably engages this narrative. Gurr notes that "successful violence increases the likelihood of its recurrence" and that a crackdown by regime authorities is graphic proof that terrorist violence is having an effect.[41] By adopting punitive measures, the regime is also likely to be reinforcing an oppositional ideological narrative which aims to show the regime in a negative light, challenge its legitimacy, and enhance the credibility of the terrorist cause,[42] thus contributing to a process identified by David Snow as "frame amplification."[43] Counterterrorist measures therefore run a much higher risk than mere tactical failure; if ill thought out they may actively aggravate the threat that they were designed to counter, thereby contributing to the construction of a more formidable opponent in the process. Gurr unconsciously echoes Marighela when he notes: "If discontent is intense and widespread in a society, revolutionary tasks are simplified; if not, there are means by which it can be increased."[44]

Finally, any theoretical model that seeks to explain the growth and longevity of terrorist organizations under democratic conditions must specify the contextual factors that create incentives or disincentives for insurgents to engage in terrorism rather than other forms of social opposition.[45] As Goodwin observes, the traditional concepts from the SMO field do not explain why oppositional groups adopt terrorism as a tactic as opposed to other forms of insurgent action.[46] Martha Crenshaw has suggested that terrorism is "the resort of an elite when conditions are not revolutionary,"[47] but Goodwin notes that there are significant examples of relatively strong insurgent groups resorting to terrorism, such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka, and relatively weak groups renouncing it, such as *Umkhonto we Sizwe* in South Africa, and thus dismisses organizational strength as the determining factor.[48]

Therefore, in addition to considering the dynamic that pushes a terrorist group to adopt violent oppositional tactics in general, it is important to ask why such groups are specifically prepared to use violence against civilian targets in a manner that is distinct from most other forms of insurgency.

In *A Theory of Categorical Terrorism* (2006), Goodwin adds to his earlier work on revolutionary insurgencies by focusing on the manner in which terrorist groups "socially construct" their enemies[49] and, in particular, the framing process which leads terrorist groups to see civilian populations as being broadly "complicitous" in the contentious actions of an oppositional state.[50] Goodwin labels the indiscriminate targeting of the members of a given collectivity "categorical terrorism,"[51] and he proposes three key contextual factors that strongly influence groups to adopt this form of terrorist violence as a political strategy: 1) a perception that large numbers of civilians benefit from, support, or, at the very least, tolerate the use of repressive measures by the state against militant groups and their constituents; 2) a large and relatively unprotected population of "complicitous" civilians; and 3) "social distance" between the terrorists, their constituents, and the target population.[52] Goodwin argues that democratic institutions convey a powerful impression of solidarity between citizens and their states, which in turn makes it reasonable for terrorist groups to conclude that attacking civilians would cause them to put substantial pressure on the state to change its ways.[53] This line of reasoning also suggests that terrorism is likely to be a particular scourge of democratic states and that almost any popular response in support of, or in opposition to, government responses is likely to invite further attacks on civilian targets.

In summary, democratic states that find themselves confronting terrorist groups are facing an enemy which, like the giant Antaeus in Greek mythology, draws strength from its connection to its environment.[54] Any defensive or offensive action taken by a state is likely to have ramifications for the hospitableness of that environment which may go beyond those intended or initially perceived: "Episodes of violent actions and confrontations should be analyzed as strategic interactions. The strategy of the target...is as important as that of the terrorists. The bloody drama is played before an audience, and its reactions are important for the outcome."[55]

Northern Ireland, 1971–72

> "*Repression both produces a grievance and helps define the available political opportunities.*"[56]

In his paper, "From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War," which was based in part on a series of interviews with Republican activists, Robert White concluded that state repression was the major determinant driving the development of IRA violence in the early 1970s.[57] Using the level of violence in Londonderry/Derry[58] as an indicator, he notes that the first recorded incident of IRA violence in the city occurred on 5 August 1970 with a handful of shots fired at a British Army sentry. By March 1972, much of the city had been "bombed out" by the Republicans.[59] I intend to focus on three key repressive actions undertaken by the British government during this period which, I believe, offer sufficient evidence to suggest they led directly to major escalations in the terrorist campaign: the introduction of internment without

trial, the use of coercive interrogation techniques, and the indiscriminate use of live ammunition against Catholic demonstrators.

In the fall of 1971, faced with escalating violence in the Province, the Unionist Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, persuaded the British government that the introduction of internment might bring the situation under control. On 9 August 1971, British troops mounted a series of raids across Northern Ireland which resulted in the detention of 342 IRA suspects. The operation, codenamed Demetrius, was characterized by poor and out-of-date intelligence which resulted in many individuals being wrongly detained. Joe Cahill, then Chief of Staff of the Provisional IRA and a prominent target of Operation Demetrius, taunted the authorities by surfacing to hold a press conference in Belfast at which he claimed only 30 of the men who had been detained were actually members of the IRA.[60]

Within Northern Ireland, internment further galvanized the nationalist community in its opposition to British rule and there was an immediate upsurge in violence against the security forces. Twenty-seven people had been killed in the first eight months of 1971, prompting the introduction of internment. In the four remaining months of the year, 147 people were killed, while 467 were killed in 1972 as a result of terrorist action.[61] The number of terrorist bombings in the Province increased dramatically from around 150 in 1970, to 1,382 in 1972.[62] In the words of a former British Intelligence officer, Frank Steele, who served in Northern Ireland during this period: "[Internment] barely damaged the IRA's command structure and led to a flood of recruits, money and weapons."[63]

In response to mounting public criticism, further fuelled by reports of the mistreatment of detainees, a wide-ranging commission of inquiry was established in 1972 under Lord Diplock to review the legal procedures used to counter Irish terrorism. In its report the Commission recommended, *inter alia*, a number of changes to the practice of internment which it witheringly described as "imprisonment at the arbitrary *diktat* of the Executive Government."[64] Although it stopped short of recommending some degree of judicial oversight, the Diplock Commission called for the process to involve the civilian authorities operating within the context of a prescribed procedure. The Commission considered it vital that steps be taken to reverse the appearance of arbitrariness which had hitherto characterized the process.

Internment was to continue in Northern Ireland until 5 December 1975, by which time a total of 1,981 people had been detained, the vast majority of them from the Catholic community.[65] The British Army estimated that up to 70% of the long-term internees became re-involved in terrorist acts after their release, so the measure clearly did little to deter committed activists.[66] The British government finally took the decision to discard the power of internment in January 1998. Announcing the decision, the Junior Northern Ireland Minister, Lord Dubs, told the House of Lords: "The Government have [sic] long held the view that internment does not represent an effective counter-terrorism measure...The power of internment has been shown to be counter-productive in terms of the tensions and divisions which it creates."[67] White wholeheartedly concurs with Lord Dubs' assessment: "After internment, many peaceful protestors turned to political violence."[68]

In the immediate aftermath of the introduction of internment in August 1971, twelve detainees were selected by the security forces for "interrogation in depth."[69] At least two further suspects detained in October 1971 went through the same process and there were most likely other, less well documented, cases. RUC interrogators working "under the supervision" of the British Army[70] applied five

well-established techniques which had previously been practised in the course of colonial emergencies: 1) hooding, 2) wall-standing, 3) subjection to noise, 4) relative deprivation of food and water, and 5) sleep deprivation.[71]

Almost a third of those detained on the first day of Operation Demetrius were released within 48 hours, and with these releases came the first stories about the ill-treatment of those held by the security forces.[72] On 31 August 1971, British Home Secretary Reginald Maudling responded to growing public concern by appointing Sir Edmund Compton to investigate complaints made by 40 suspects apprehended on 9 August 1971. These included complaints of ill-treatment made by detainees not selected for "in depth" interrogation. Additional complaints involved the practice of forcing detainees to run an obstacle course over broken glass and rough ground whilst being beaten and, perhaps most seriously of all, deceiving detainees into believing that they were to be thrown from high-flying helicopters.[73] Despite accepting that these events did indeed take place, Sir Edmund reported: "Our investigations have not led us to conclude that any of the grouped or individual complainants suffered physical brutality as we understand the term."[74] The failure of the Compton Report to meaningfully address the abuses that had occurred in British detention facilities further damaged the government's credibility.[75]

However, the matter did not end there. On 16 December 1971, the Republic of Ireland filed an application with the European Commission on Human Rights alleging that the emergency procedures applied against suspected terrorists in Northern Ireland violated several articles of the European Convention on Human Rights.[76] The case was referred to the European Court of Human Rights for adjudication, and the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom was the first inter-state case ever brought before the European Court.[77] It is depressing to note that little more than a decade earlier Dublin had been Britain's ally in combating cross-border IRA activity. Reviewing the evidence in December 1977, the Court found the "five techniques" to be "cruel, inhuman and degrading" and thus in breach of the Convention, but stopped short of describing them as torture.[78]

The actual utility of coercive interrogation was also addressed at some length in the course of the Ireland v. United Kingdom case. The British government sought to argue that it had been necessary to introduce such techniques to combat a rise in terrorist violence. The government claimed that the two "operations of interrogation in depth" addressed by the Court had obtained a considerable quantity of actionable intelligence, including the identification of 700 active Republican terrorists and the discovery of cases of individual responsibility for about 85 previously unexplained criminal incidents.[79] However, other well-informed sources are more skeptical. Former British Intelligence officer Frank Steele told the journalist Peter Taylor: "As for the special interrogation techniques, they were damned stupid as well as morally wrong…in practical terms, the additional usable intelligence they produced was, I understand, minimal."[80] Certainly the last quarter of 1971, the period during which these techniques were most employed, was marked by mounting, not decreasing, violence—a fairly obvious yardstick by which to measure their efficacy.[81]

The final incident to have a major impact on the evolution of IRA violence in this period was an event that has become known as Bloody Sunday. On 30 January 1972, soldiers from the British 1st Parachute Regiment opened fire on civilian demonstrators in Londonderry/Derry, killing 13 and wounding 29. The march that sparked the violence had been called to protest internment. Rocks had been thrown at the soldiers and a shot allegedly fired, but the disproportionate British response

prompted "widespread international condemnation."[82] In Dublin, an enraged mob stormed the British Embassy, burning it to the ground. The British government appointed the Widgery Tribunal to investigate the incident, but the Tribunal exonerated the soldiers involved, handing the Republican community yet a further propaganda victory. The nature of IRA violence changed dramatically after Bloody Sunday, as the incident prompted the first mainland bombing of the Troubles on 22 February 1972, when the Official IRA left a car bomb outside the Officer's Mess of the Parachute Regiment in Aldershot, Hampshire.[83] The blast killed five female kitchen staff, a gardener and, ironically, a Catholic Army Chaplain. An official IRA spokesman issued a statement in Dublin that the attack had been carried out "in revenge" for the Bloody Sunday killings.[84] Deliberate attacks on civilian targets on the British Mainland soon followed, including four simultaneous car bombs left in London in March 1973, bombs at mainline London railway stations in September 1973, and in public houses in Guildford and Birmingham in the autumn of 1974.

Reflecting on an interview conducted with a volunteer who joined the IRA in 1972 as a consequence of the events outlined above, White comments: "State repression had introduced new grievances that caused him to interpret these new injustices in the light of his knowledge of long-term grievances, his commitment to people affected by the repression, and his knowledge of and interaction with those who had reacted to the repression by supporting political violence."[85] White's quantitative research complemented his interview sample: "Regression of the measure of political violence on measures of economic hardship and state repression shows that IRA violence increased significantly in months following incidents in which the security forces shot down civilians (unorganized repression) and months in which the state was engaged in organized repression (internment)."[86] White concluded that British security policy in Northern Ireland between 1971 and 1972 gave rise to a classic case of "frame amplification" amongst activists in the Republican movement and their supporters in the broader Catholic civil rights movement. Repressive British action reinforced the legitimacy of the Republican cause, persuaded Republicans of the efficacy of political violence, and created an imperative for action.[87]

Northern Ireland, 1956–1963

"*Hands across the border.*"[88]

Internment had been used successfully by the British government during the 1956–1963 IRA cross-border campaign. Brian Faulkner again played a major role in its introduction, this time as Northern Ireland's Minister for Home Affairs. Approximately 300 members of the IRA were interned.[89] This begs the question why such a repressive measure did not provoke the same sort of opposition from the Catholic community in the late 1950s and early 1960s as it did in the early 1970s. Does this earlier successful use of internment falsify the argument I have been developing above? The answer lies in the different political context in which internment was applied.[90]

The successful use of internment during the 1956–1963 campaign can largely be ascribed to the fact that it was applied simultaneously by governments on both sides of the Irish border.[91] Tacit cooperation between London and Dublin as the conflict developed meant that the IRA was deprived of a safe haven in the south and lacked

political space to organize effectively. The adoption of internment by the Irish government also imbued British use of the tactic with added legitimacy. During this earlier campaign, the IRA was out of step with the political *zeitgeist*, it was unable to generate lasting popular support either north or south of the border,[92] and could not convincingly claim to be acting in defense of the Catholic community as it was able to do so effectively a decade later. By 1971 the political landscape had changed completely, no Dublin government could contemplate cooperating with the authorities in the north when it was the Catholic minority in the north as a whole that appeared to be under attack rather than "an isolated band of republican intransigents."[93] Without Irish support in the 1970s, the tactical impact of internment was greatly reduced and perceptions of its political legitimacy much diminished. The apparent arbitrariness of the measure's application, the violence with which it was applied, and the many intelligence failures that accompanied it only served to fuel the "frame amplification" process.

Israel, 2000–2005

> "*It is a certainty that there is no way to fight terrorism—other than to fight it.*"[94]

The Israeli response to terrorist threats has been noticeably more aggressive than that of most modern democracies and the techniques employed by the Israeli security forces include patently "repressive" measures such as targeted assassination, property demolition, military incursions, coercive interrogation, and curfews. Since the beginning of the Al Aqsa *intifada* in September 2000, the level of political violence visited upon Israelis has reached new heights. In the first *intifada*, the ratio of Palestinians to Israelis killed was 25 to 1; in the second *intifada* the ratio has dropped to 3 to 1.[95] Between September 2000 and December 2002, Palestinian terrorists killed 443 Israeli civilians including 83 minors.[96] This escalation soon demanded a dramatic response from the Israeli government, and it came in the shape of a more visible, military-led policy of targeted killing. I will focus on the Israeli use of this one tactic and the impact it has had—amongst other factors—on the level of political violence during the Al Aqsa *intifada*. The Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of February 2005 is often regarded as having ended the *intifada*, although violence persists in the region.

Targeted assassination has been a well documented feature of Israeli counterterrorist policy for several decades now,[97] but until the outbreak of the Al Aqsa *intifada* it was a weapon used sparingly, more often than not overseas rather than in the Occupied Territories or Palestinian Authority. In an attempt to imbue the process with a degree of legitimacy, in February 2002 the Judge Advocate General of the IDF, Menachem Finkelstein, issued three conditions governing the use of targeted killing: 1) The Palestinian Authority must ignore appeals for the arrest of the target; 2) The Israeli security forces must conclude that it would be impossible to effect an arrest without the PA's help; and 3) The killing must be carried out only to prevent an imminent or future terrorist attack, not out of revenge or as a reprisal.[98] The Israeli High Court supported these conditions in a strongly issued opinion on 29 January 2002 that rejected calls for an end to the policy of targeted killings.[99] Strikes are approved by both the IDF Chief of Staff and by the Israeli cabinet. Supporters of

the policy argue that the existence of some measure of judicial review and due process distinguishes "targeted killings" from the terrorist attacks mounted by Palestinian groups. A poll conducted in July 2001 by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University found that 70% of those Israelis questioned supported the policy of targeted assassination.[100]

Precise figures for the number of targeted assassinations carried out by the Israeli security forces during the Al Aqsa *intifada* are hard to come by. The Israeli human rights information center B'Tselem reports the targeted killing of 102 Palestinians in territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority between October 2000 and April 2003.[101] The Jewish Virtual Library lists 69 Israeli "hits" between November 2000 and July 2005, a figure which includes commando raids, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) bombings, sniper attacks, and strikes by air-to-ground missiles. The most significant Israeli covert operations of the Al Aqsa *intifada* include the killings of the Fatah leader in Tulkarem, Ra'd Karmi, in January 2001, PFLP Secretary General Abu Ali Mustafa in Ramallah in August 2001, Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in March 2004, and his successor as the leader of Hamas, Dr. Abdel Aziz Al Rantisi, in April 2004. Each attack has provoked promises of revenge. Karmi's assassination resulted directly in attacks by Tanzim and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which claimed the lives of 57 Israelis.[102] The Israeli Defense Force was ultimately obliged to occupy the entire city of Tulkarm in an effort to stem the attacks.[103] The PFLP pledged to target Israeli government ministers in retaliation for the killing of Abu Ali Mustafa, and Israeli Tourism Minister Rechavam Ze'evy was killed by the organization in October 2001.[104]

There is "nearly a consensus" among Israel's defense officials that targeted killings are "the most effective and least injurious way" to deter Palestinian terror attacks.[105] Israeli officials believe that "targeted killings" have a particularly severe impact on tightly compartmentalized groups like Hamas and PIJ, as the elimination of key figures in the group's hierarchy can throw its operations into chaos as cells find themselves cut off from each other and are unable to reestablish contact: "There are no headquarters, files, computers, radio equipment, or organizational memory... removing one activist can handicap or destroy a cell."[106] Such actions also seize back the initiative from the terrorists, placing them on the defensive. Former Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, has explained: "The plan is to place the terrorists in varying situations every day and knock them off balance so that they will be busy protecting themselves."[107] Certainly the impact of this policy was felt by the various terrorist organizations operating in territory under the Palestinian Authority. The Israeli strikes drove the leadership of Hamas underground on its own territory, and in February 2005 Palestinian negotiators made cessation of the killings a prerequisite for agreeing to a ceasefire in advance of the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit.[108]

Yet does the policy really work? In the short term there has been a decrease in the number of attacks on Israeli targets. In 2002 there were 60 suicide attacks, while in 2003 this number decreased by more than 50% to 26 suicide attacks. There was also a considerable decrease in the number of fatalities: from 452 killed in 2002 to 214 killed in 2003. In 2004 this number decreased further, and up to September 2004 a total of 97 people had been killed.[109] However, it is important to note that "targeted killing" is not the only security measure credited with bringing about this reduction in the number of attacks. The security fence which the Israeli government began erecting in July 2003 is widely regarded to have been the most significant single initiative. Since construction of the fence began, the number of attacks

has declined by more than 90%. The number of Israelis murdered and wounded has decreased by more than 70% and 85% respectively.[110] The number of attacks may have declined but the terrorist organizations themselves have proved to be surprisingly resilient. During Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002, Israeli military forces claimed to have arrested or killed all Hamas terrorists in the West Bank who had mastered the formula for making homemade explosives, dealing a serious blow to the organization. Yet Hamas bombmakers from the Gaza Strip soon infiltrated the West Bank and began producing explosives, revitalizing the organization.[111] This pattern appears to have been repeated again and again in the aftermath of successful strikes, and as the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip began in August 2005, Hamas was claiming credit for having driven Israeli settlers out of the Palestinian lands and was already setting its sights on doing the same in the West Bank.[112]

The successful assassination of Fathi Shikaki in Malta in October 1995 is often held out as an example of how surgical strikes at key personalities within a terrorist organization can cripple its operations.[113] Shikaki was the head of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and was such a dominant figure that the organization drifted without his leadership. However, PIJ was revived by the Al Aqsa *intifada*, establishing a significant presence in the West Bank cities of Hebron and Jenin. PIJ has been linked to approximately 1,000 attacks against Israeli targets since the start of the *intifada*, in which about 150 people have been killed and approximately 950 wounded.[114] PIJ has been an active sponsor of suicide bombings throughout the *intifada*, the most prominent of which targeted the Maxim Restaurant in Haifa in October 2003, killing 21 Jewish and Arab patrons.[115] Moreover, PIJ's absence from the field was more than compensated for in the mid to late 1990s by the emergence of Hamas as the voice of frustrated Palestinian youth. This example suggests that targeted assassination may have temporary tactical utility, but has little positive impact at the strategic level and simply reinforces and amplifies the "grievance frames" of the combatants. The level of operational activity sustained by PIJ during the Al Aqsa *intifada* far exceeds that under Shikaki's leadership in the early 1990s.[116]

It is also important to note that such attacks have not always struck the intended targets and have resulted in a high proportion of civilian casualties. Steven David notes that between the eruption of the Al Aqsa *intifada* in September 2000 and the autumn of 2002, the Israeli security forces had targeted and killed approximately 80 Palestinian militants, but that in these operations around 50 unrelated civilians had also been killed.[117] Yael Stein similarly comments that about a third of those killed in the course of "targeted killings" have been innocent bystanders.[118] In one particularly bloody operation carried out in Gaza on 22 July 2002, 13 innocent bystanders (including 10 minors) were killed in an air-strike which targeted the Hamas official Salah Shahada. A one-ton bomb was dropped on Shahada's house—hardly discriminate.[119] Yael Stein concludes: "Even common sense suggests that these actions, especially the deaths of so many innocent bystanders, could fuel the cycle, strengthen motivation, and pave the way for further violent acts that the policy was meant to prevent."[120] This certainly seems to be the case. An editorial comment by Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, published in the Egyptian weekly *Al-Ahram* during the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, noted that the talks were taking place amid an "unprecedented degree of hostility between Palestinians and Israelis."[121]

Finally some hard figures, in 1999, according to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research: Hamas had the support of only ten percent of Palestinians. In March 2004, the month of the assassination of Hamas spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed

Yassin, that percentage doubled to twenty percent.[122] Following Rantisi's assassination in April 2004, a survey found that for the first time, Hamas has surpassed its rival Al Fatah in support with thirty-one percent to Fatah's twenty-seven.[123] In December 2004, Hamas took control of seven town councils in the West Bank, reducing the number of Fatah-controlled councils to just twelve.[124] In early 2005, Hamas took control of seven out of ten councils in Gaza.[125] Clearly there are also other factors at work, such as disenchantment with mainstream Fatah politicians, the ebb and flow of the Peace Process, and the full panoply of Israeli tactics, but this is a suggestive pattern nonetheless. While Israeli assassinations may impede the effectiveness of certain terrorist organizations for a time, they embolden and radicalize the Palestinians as a whole. In the words of Vincent Cannistraro, the former head of the CIA's Counterterrorism Operations: "As a counterterrorist technique, assassination is not only immoral but ineffective in accomplishing its stated goal: the deterrence of terrorism. And it comes back to haunt the perpetrators in ways they never expected."[126] Or as Michael Gross of the University of Haifa puts it more simply: "Assassination fails the test of utility."[127]

Italy, 1969–1982

> "*We lost a lot of time before understanding that military measures...
> accomplished nothing except to create 'repressive illusions.'*"[128]

Anthony Oberschall has written that "the start of terrorist campaign is a precipitating incident or condition that turns a group to going underground and to violence."[129] Italy might be the purest democratic case of "state construction," as it was the repressive actions by forces closely (or perhaps directly) allied with the Italian security forces which were behind a series of right-wing terrorist attacks between 1969–1974 that provoked a violent response from the left. The late 1960s in Italy were marked by widespread labor unrest. The summer of 1967 became known as "the hot summer" because of repeated strikes action by the trade union movement. 1968 was marked, as elsewhere in Europe, by riotous student protests.[130] The specter of a communist takeover haunted Italian conservatives, and it now appears that in 1969 a group of right-wing state employees in the intelligence services, police, and judiciary opted to take matters into their own hands.[131]

On 12 December 1969, a bomb exploded without warning in a bank in Milan's *Piazza Fontana*, killing 16 customers and injuring more than 80. Almost simultaneously, three further blasts occurred in Rome, including one at the Altar to the Fatherland (the Italian equivalent of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier). A fifth device was discovered in Milan and neutralized.[132] The targets were all chosen with the deliberate intent of signaling left-wing involvement,[133] and the authorities responded by blaming anarchist radicals. A series of arrests followed, including that of an anarchist railway worker Giuseppe Pinelli who "fell" to his death from a window of Milan's central police station on 15 December while under interrogation, an event immortalized in Dario Fo's play *The Accidental Death of an Anarchist* (1970). The impact of the *Piazza Fontana* bombing was profound: "This event loomed large in the mental geography of Italian extremists. The event itself was horrifying, but its ripple effects, in the form of arrests, indictments, trials, and miscarriages of justice, amounted to...proof of the malevolent duplicity of the Italian government."[134] The

Red Brigades were founded in 1970 by members of the *Collectivo Politico Metropo-litano*,[135] thus confirming another of Oberschall's observations: "In the theory of collective action the surest, quickest, low-cost way of mobilizing a social, political, or religious movement is to use an already-existing infrastructure and to convert it to new uses."[136]

The emergence of militant left-wing protest groups in the wake of the *Piazza Fontana* bombing provoked more overt neo-fascist attacks by groups with such names as Black Order, Revolutionary Fascist Nuclei, and New Order: 6 people were killed on a train in 1970; 8 by a bomb planted in a union meeting at the *Piazza della Loggia* in Brescia and 12 in a train bombing in Italicus near Bologna in 1974. Neo-fascist terrorism reached a climax in 1980 when 84 people were killed and 200 wounded in a bomb blast at Bologna train station. The date of the bombing coincided with the opening of a trial in Bologna of right-wingers accused of the 1974 Italicus train bombing.[137] In contrast, the first left-wing assassination only came in May 1972, when the detective accused of murdering Giuseppe Pinelli, Luigi Calabresi, was gunned down outside his Milan apartment.[138] The term "terrorism" was applied to left-wing violence for the first time by an Italian Prime Minister in 1974, and the Italian police were slow to react to this real, rather than invented, threat.[139]

The battle between right and left began in earnest in 1972. Donatella Della Porta has identified 4,362 acts of politically motivated violence and 6,153 unclaimed attacks on property during the so-called "Years of Lead."[140] These incidents left 351 people dead and 768 injured. Several dozen organizations on both the political right and the political left claimed responsibility for some 2,712 incidents, using 657 different *noms de guerre*. More than 6,000 people would ultimately be charged by the authorities with terrorist-related offenses.[141] However, it is notable that while the Italian police and security forces later enjoyed considerable success in bringing left-wing terrorists to justice, notably few right-wing terrorists would ever see the inside of a prison cell. This fuelled speculation that these groups were protected (and maybe even staffed) by the Italian intelligence community.[142]

The Italian authorities enjoyed their greatest period of success against the Red Brigades between 1974 and 1976 with the adoption of a purely law enforcement approach. Two special law enforcement structures were established: the General Inspectorate for Action against Terrorism (*Inspettorato Generale per la Lotta contro il Terrorismo*) and the Special Group of the Judiciary Police (*Nucleo Speciale di Polizia Giudiziaria*). In two years, these two organizations were able to build sufficient effective prosecution cases against the relatively inexperienced left-wing terrorist cells. By 1976, the Armed Proletarian Nuclei had dissolved and fewer than a dozen regular members of the Red Brigades were still at large.[143] Yet both police entities were dissolved themselves in 1976 after a change of government,[144] and victory was allowed slip to through the authorities' fingers.

Afforded a sudden window of opportunity to mobilize unmolested, the reconstituted Red Brigades launched an explicit offensive against the conservative Christian Democratic Party in 1977.[145] Terrorist "events" peaked in 1978 with 240 incidents,[146] the most significant of which was the kidnapping in March of the former Prime Minster and then leader of the Christian Democrat Party, Aldo Moro. Moro was held for 55 days, subjected to a People's Court, and finally executed. In what became known as the "emergency period," the authorities responded by cracking down on left-wing activists in general, which included members of the

Autonomia Operaia, radical leftists whose ties with the terrorist left were not at all clear.[147] Della Porta notes: "My data on the evolution of recruitment in left-wing terrorist organizations indicates a big jump in 1979…just when the judiciary and police apparata increased the repression against the semi-legal groups of the so-called *autonomia*."[148]

The tide eventually turned against the Red Brigades in the early 1980s as a consequence of a variety of disparate but related factors. Policing methods undoubtedly improved over time, restricting the activities of the terrorist groups.[149] Yet it was a shift in attitudes on the political left, coupled with deft legislative steps to take advantage of this shift, which made the crucial difference.[150] The Moro kidnapping had outraged the vast majority of the Italian public[151] and provoked an unequivocal rejection of terrorism from the Italian Communist Party leadership, which had found its public support slipping in the wake of Moro's murder.[152] The radical left began to fragment as a vigorous internal debate erupted over the tactics employed by the Red Brigades and other leftist terrorist groups such as *Prima Linea*.[153] The more extremist elements began to alienate their comrades and supporters.[154] Two key events exasperated the growing splits: The murder in January 1979 of a Genoese Communist Shop Steward, Guido Rossa, suspected of informing on the Red Brigades, and *Prima Linea*'s brutal attack on the School of Industrial Management in Turin in which ten students and members of staff were kneecapped by the terrorists in a warning to other aspirant capitalists.[155] The Red Brigades were degenerating into little more than a vicious criminal gang intent upon avoiding arrest and settling scores, and their supporters knew it.[156]

In 1982, the Italian authorities exploited the division in the radical left by introducing a "collaboration" law which allowed for the proportional reduction of sentences passed for crimes committed prior to 1981 in return for collaboration with the authorities on the part of the prisoner. This might be no more than a full confession by the prisoner to his or her own crimes. Within 120 days of the law entering into force, 389 terrorist prisoners had taken advantage of the new law, of which 78 were classified as *grandi pentiti* who had made an "exceptional contribution" to the authorities' investigations.[157] The "collaboration" law created a "political exit" for former members of the Red Brigades and within a year of its introduction, outgoing Interior Minister Virginio Rognoni was able to leave office confident that terrorism had been "politically defeated."[158] Nevertheless, this conflict could, perhaps, have been avoided entirely. The emergence of the Italian Red Brigades stands out as the purest example of "state construction" that can be found in the gamut of terrorism literature—a bogeyman created by the ruling class that took on a destructive life of its own.

Québec, 1963–1972

"*A drastic but necessary action*."[159]

The *Front de Libération de Québec* (FLQ) was a small revolutionary organization inspired by Québec nationalist sentiment and the international socialist movement,[160] which was also avowedly influenced by the writings of Carlos Marighela.[161] From its foundation in February 1963, the FLQ was involved in a low-level terrorist campaign against the Canadian government that averaged 40 "events" a year between 1968 and

1971, amounting to 166 "violent attacks."[162] The FLQ began by bombing military targets, but later extended its campaign to include government buildings and economic infrastructure targets usually related to industrial disputes. Members of the FLQ trained with the Palestinian Liberation Organization.[163]

On 5 October 1970, the so-called Liberation Cell of the FLQ escalated the conflict by kidnapping the British Consul in Québec, James Cross. In return for his release, the kidnappers demanded freedom for 23 "political prisoners" held by the Canadian authorities, the publication of the FLQ's political manifesto in the national media, the identity of a police informer, the reinstatement of striking postal workers, and $500,000. On 10 October 1970, a second FLQ group, calling itself the Chenier Cell, kidnapped the Québec Minister of Labour and Immigration and Deputy Premier, Pierre Laporte, placing additional pressure on the authorities to concede to the terrorists' demands. Instead, on 16 October 1970, the Canadian government invoked the War Measures Act (1914), characterizing the kidnappings as an "apprehended insurrection" and began rounding up suspected members of the FLQ. *Habeas corpus* was suspended and some 456 Québec citizens were arrested, held, and interrogated without access to counsel or judicial review.[164] The FLQ was declared a proscribed organization with retrospective application. However, all but a handful of the detainees were later released without any charges being made.[165] On 17 October, Pierre Laporte was killed by his kidnappers, apparently while trying to escape. His body was callously dumped in the trunk of an abandoned car. James Cross was finally released unharmed on 4 December 1970 in exchange for safe passage to Cuba for his captors.[166] An intensive police response to the kidnappings led to a series of arrests and convictions from late 1970 to 1972. Between these arrests and the voluntary exile of the members of the Liberation Cell to Cuba, violent *Québecois* activism was brought to an effective end.[167]

Does the "October Crisis" suggest that there is a place for "repression" in the counterterrorist arsenals of liberal democracies? Professor Reg Whitaker from the University of Victoria certainly believes so: "However controversial the method employed, the result was clear and unequivocal—the FLQ and, with it, the entire terrorist tendency of the sovereignty movement in Québec, was eradicated.[168] However, this is not the whole story. An argument can be made that although the actions of the Canadian government were both repressive and, as some legal scholars have argued, illegitimate,[169] the actions of the FLQ were perceived to be even more so. The murder of Pierre Laporte, a native Québecker, turned even separatist sympathizers against the FLQ.[170] The FLQ was simply not able to develop a "grievance frame" sufficiently strong to justify its actions or undermine those of the government. Opinion in French Canada remained divided over the use of the War Measures Act, but significantly, two of the largest popular French language papers, *La Presse* and *Le Soleil*, supported the measure.[171] The major labor unions in Québec formed a common front to denounce the FLQ.[172] The leading separatist *Parti Québecois* condemned political violence as "humanly immoral and politically pointless."[173]

Another significant factor which makes the FLQ something of an exception to the general rule is that the organization itself is often viewed as "a highly overrated threat."[174] The FLQ, in the words of Ross and Gurr, was "as much a state of mind as an organization" and even before the "October Crisis" it lacked numbers, popular support, or even loose ties to a legitimate political party.[175] One must conclude that it was effective police work—not internment—that resulted in the apprehension of

FLQ cells still operating in 1971 and 1972 after the Laporte and Cross kidnappings.[176] The FLQ may indeed have been swamped by the security resources arrayed against it, but perhaps the most crucial factor was that it managed to alienate through its actions the ''sea'' in which it had to swim to survive.[177]

Federal Republic of Germany, 1967–1998

> "*We maintain that the formation of armed resistance groups at this point in time in the Federal Republic in West Berlin is right, is possible, and is morally justified. That it is right, possible, and justified to form urban guerrillas here and now.*"[178]

The ''precipitating incident''[179] for the emergence of leftist terrorism in West Germany was the death of a student, Benno Ohnesorg, in June 1967 at the hands of the Berlin police during a demonstration against the visit to West Germany by the Shah of Iran.[180] Ohnesorg's death was seen by the political left as the inevitable culmination of a growing pattern of ''police violence out of all proportion'' to the threat posed by student disorder.[181] As the student militant Michael Baumann put it in his memoir, *How it all Began*: "After that, things were different…something terrible got started in me."[182]

The original nucleus of the Red Army Faction was a group of students from the Free University of West Berlin led by a petty criminal, Andreas Baader, and his girl-friend, Gudrun Ensslin. They started out fairly inauspiciously in 1968 by planting a number of incendiary devices in a Frankfurt department store with two other comrades. The devices did little damage and the four were subsequently arrested.

While Baader was still in prison, his cohorts were joined by a university lecturer and prominent left-wing journalist, Ulrike Meinhof. Meinhof brought greater political focus to the group and is considered the driving force behind the founding of the Red Army Faction (RAF) in the spring of 1970 along with Baader's defense counsel, Horst Mahler.[183] In September 1970, the group mounted an ambitious simultaneous robbery of three West Berlin banks. In communiqués issued to coincide with the action, the general public was made aware of the RAF for the first time.[184] The West German police scored their first big success in October 1970 by arresting six members of the gang. Later the same month, three other gang members were involved in a shoot-out with police in which one officer was killed—the first murder that can be attributed to the RAF. More arrests followed in 1971, and two RAF members were killed in further shoot-outs with the police.[185]

The Red Army Faction had crossed the Rubicon and started to redefine itself as being in the forefront of the struggle against what it denounced as American imperialism. A series of bomb attacks against U.S. installations followed in 1972. Four U.S. personnel were killed and 20 injured in attacks in Frankfurt and Heidelberg.[186] The RAF also attacked police buildings in Augsburg and Munich as well as the conservative Axel Springer publishing house in Hamburg.[187]

The German government responded to this offensive by increasing the size of the federal police service and by establishing a new counterterrorist agency. The government also drafted special legislation granting immunity from prosecution to terrorists prepared to turn state's evidence. Results were not long in coming. In June 1972, Andreas Baader and two accomplices were arrested at a garage which was being used

to store bomb-making equipment. Meinhof, Ensslin, and RAF notables Holger Meins and Jan Carl Raspe were captured in separate arrests soon afterwards.[188]

With the leadership of the group in prison awaiting trial, the RAF entered a new phase. A special court and prison complex was constructed in Stammheim for the trial of Baader and his accomplices, which finally got underway in May 1975. In 1976, the Bundestag passed a number of antiterrorist laws which, *inter alia*, proscribed membership in a terrorist group and allowed for greater police powers of surveillance.[189] The remaining RAF members still at large began to splinter into smaller groups, the most significant being the 2nd June Movement (the date of Benno Ohnesorg's death), which concentrated on kidnapping prominent West German industrialists.

1977 was a watershed year for the RAF. In January, the group launched a major attack on the U.S. Army's principal nuclear weapons depot in Europe located on a military base in Giessen. The attack was beaten off by the infantry platoon guarding the bunkers. In April, the group murdered West Germany's Chief Federal Prosecutor, and in August the Chairman of the Dresdner Bank, Jürgen Pronto, was murdered by an RAF commando which included his own goddaughter, Susanne Albrecht. In September, the group snatched Hans Martin Schleyer, President of the Confederation of German Industry and Federation of German Employers, in an attack that prefigured the Moro kidnapping. The kidnappers demanded the release of those members of the Baader-Meinhof gang still in custody. Negotiations dragged on until mid-October when, in a gesture of solidarity, PFLP-SOG terrorists hijacked a German airline and flew it to Mogadishu, Somalia.[190]

German Special Forces units (GSG9) were able to recapture the Lufthansa aircraft and rescue the hostages. When news of GSG9's success broke in the Stammheim jail, Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe all committed suicide, an event which prompted a dramatic decline in RAF activities, further reinforced by continued police successes against the group.[191] After a three-year hiatus, the RAF surfaced briefly in an abortive attempt to kill NATO Commander-in-Chief, General Alexander Haig, in June 1979.[192] In its first ten years (1969–1979), the Red Army Faction and allied left-wing groups were responsible for 25 murders in Germany and 44 violent assaults, 247 acts of arson and bombings, and 69 other criminal "events," including armed robbery.[193]

The RAF eventually regrouped under the leadership of Christian Klar and remained somewhat active through the 1980s, assassinating the Hesse Minster for Economic Affairs in May 1981 and bombing the U.S. Air Force base in Ramstein while also attempting to assassinate U.S. General Frederick Kroesen in August 1981.[194] Klar was arrested during a bank robbery in 1982, and by 1984 the West German police were only actively pursuing 16 wanted members of the RAF.[195] In August 1985, the RAF murdered a young U.S. soldier, Edward Pimental, outside the Rhine-Main Air Force Base for his identity card, which was used the following day to smuggle a bomb onto the base. The attack provoked a backlash against the RAF on the political left which was going through a period of redefinition.[196] In an attempt to shore up support, the surviving members of the RAF reached out to likeminded terrorist groups such as *Action Directe* in France and Belgium's Communist Combatant Cells in an attempt to establish a "West European Guerrilla." Yet the RAF's key partner, *Action Directe*, was broken up by the French police in 1987.[197] Any further hopes of a revival were dashed by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the reunification of the German Federal and Democratic Republics.

In April 1998, the RAF announced that it was disbanding. It sent an eight-page typewritten statement to Reuters news agency announcing: "Today we are ending this project. The urban guerrilla group in the form of the RAF is now history." Officials at the (BKA) Federal Criminal Office in Wiesbaden confirmed the authenticity of the document. "We are stuck in a dead end," the RAF statement said, acknowledging that the group had made strategic errors, but expressing no contrition or regret for its actions.[198]

Well-coordinated professional law enforcement can in time score major successes against terrorist groups—even against such diffuse entities like the RAF, which lack a true organizational infrastructure.[199] Andreas Baader and his group were spurred to action by heavy-handed police tactics,[200] but the German authorities adopted a much more measured response to the terrorist threat after a while. By keeping the emphasis on conventional law enforcement tactics, the state—despite the evocative anti-fascist "grievance frame" to which the RAF consciously appealed[201]—was able to maintain a posture of moral legitimacy during its struggle with the RAF which appeared convincing to the vast majority of the German people. Ultimately it was the RAF that was to become discredited in the eyes of its client constituency on the left.[202] In the words of the former head of the Hamburg security service (LfV), Hans Josef Horchem: "The state reacted with firmness and with flexibility. Overreaction was avoided. The terrorists were unable to mobilize fresh recruits to fight on their side as a result of exploitation of any behavioral errors on the part of the police authorities and other organs of the state."[203]

Conclusion

> "*Ultimately, the struggle between terrorism and democracy is one for legitimacy and maintaining the latter is strategically more important for democratic governments than winning short-term victories through tactical 'quick fixes' which might seem effective but turn democracies into something that begins to mirror the terrorist opponent.*"[204]

Carlos Marighela believed that "moral superiority" sustained urban guerrilla movements, and this comparative study suggests that he was right.[205] Connecting causes with consequences is always difficult,[206] but the case studies outlined above all suggest an apparent correlation between the illegitimate use of coercive measures of social control by democratic states and both the growth and intensity of domestic terrorism. Relatively coercive measures can work, as in Canada and Northern Ireland during the 1956–63 cross-border campaign, when they are used in a manner which most of those involved in the terrorist narrative consider legitimate. Typically, as in the example of Italy, such legitimate measures work best when coupled with a political exit strategy that allows individuals involved with a terrorist group a "way out."[207] In Northern Ireland at the outset of "the Troubles" and in Israel during the Al Aqsa *intifada*, illegitimate state repression provoked a significant escalation in terrorism; in Italy and Germany it provided the spark that escalated social protest to terrorist violence.

The issue of legitimacy or "moral superiority" also cuts both ways. Adrian Guelke has suggested that the key to the decline of terrorism lies in changing perceptions of legitimacy by the groups that use it.[208] Studying terrorist groups active in the

1970s and 1980s, Martha Crenshaw posited three scenarios which might result in the decline of a terrorist movement: the disintegration of group cohesion, a decision to abandon the armed struggle, and effective state counteraction.[209] Legitimacy has a role to play in all three scenarios. Jeffrey Ross and Ted Gurr have highlighted such factors as "*burn out*" (declining group commitment) and "*backlash*" (declining public support) as prompting group decline.[210] A loss of legitimacy in the eyes of its members and supporters was fatal for the FLQ, the RAF, and the Red Brigades. Della Porta adds that the "backlash" will inevitably come when a group abandons "social propaganda for a 'private war' against the state," as happened in both Italy and Germany.[211]

While the sequence of events in each of the case studies cited above is not in itself proof of causation, it does suggest a thesis which is worthy of further investigation and original research. As Robert White well understood, "finding that state repression is the major factor explaining the development of political violence has important policy implications."[212] Ted Gurr suggested that a state challenged by political violence had two basic courses of action—to increase coercive measures, or to meet some or all dissident demands.[213] I believe that this study suggests a third option for a democratic state confident in the underlying legitimacy of its position: Stay the course. Focus on the criminal element and treat terrorism as a law enforcement problem. It may be necessary to trim the sails of state by reorganizing counterterrorist infrastructure or introducing some additional "measures of social control," but here the watchword should be moderation. States "socially construct" the battlefields on which they are fighting and this can be an advantage if they choose to fight from the moral high ground. Denying political opportunity is the best "strategy of control."[214] As one of the earliest scholars of terrorism, Grant Wardlaw, has observed: "Both analysis and history tell us that lack of confidence and over-reaction in the face of terrorist attack are at least as dangerous as many of the attacks themselves."[215]

Notes

1. Carlos Marighela, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* (Havana: Tricontinental, 1970), 35–36.

2. Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 25.

3. Charles Tilly, "Terror, Terrorism and Terrorists," *Sociological Theory* 22, no. 1 (March 2004): 12.

4. Roberta Senechal de la Roche, "Toward a Scientific Theory of Terrorism," *Sociological Theory* 22, no. 1 (March 2004): 1.

5. Omar Malik, *Enough of the Definition of Terrorism* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001), 1.

6. Boaz Ganor, *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?* (Herzliya, Israel: The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 1998), 1.

7. David Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 47.

8. Goodwin (see note 2 above), 25.

9. Albert Bergesen and Omar Lizardo, "International Terrorism and the World System," *Sociological Theory* 22, no. 1 (March 2004): 40.

10. Anthony Oberschall, "Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory," *Sociological Theory* 22, no. 1 (March 2004): 26.

11. Senechal de la Roche (see note 4 above), 3.

12. Jeff Goodwin, "A Theory of a Categorical Terrorism," *Social Forces* 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 2027.

13. Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 14.

14. Goodwin (see note 2 above), 58.

15. Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970) and David Snyder, "Collective Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22 (1978).

16. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968) and Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).

17. Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

18. Gurr (see note 15 above), 21.

19. Ibid., 317.

20. Ibid., 326.

21. Ibid., 319.

22. Ibid., 317.

23. Ibid., 351–353.

24. Ibid., 358.

25. Edward Muller, "Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence," *American Sociological Review* 50, no. 1 (1985): 48.

26. Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want* (New York: Random House, 2006), 182.

27. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 59.

28. Douglas Hibbs, *Mass Political Violence* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), 85.

29. Hans Josef Horchem, "The Lost Revolution of West Germany's Terrorists," *Terrorism and Political Violence* (July 1989): 354.

30. Richardson (see note 26 above), 182.

31. Muller (see note 25 above), 48.

32. Goodwin (see note 2 above), 25.

33. Ibid., 40.

34. Ibid., 48.

35. McAdam et al. (see note 13 above), 33.

36. David Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Steven Worden, and Robert Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (August 1986): 466.

37. See Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 17 and Ulrich Linse, "Propaganda by Deed and Direct Action: Two Concepts of Anarchist Violence," in Wolfgang Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld, eds., *Social Protest, Violence and Terror in 19th and 20th Century Europe* (New York: St. Martin's, 1982).

38. Bergesen and Lizardo (see note 9 above), 40.

39. Tilly (see note 3 above), 9.

40. Ibid.

41. Gurr (see note 15 above), 327 and Oberschall (see note 10 above), 29.

42. Gurr (see note 15 above), 354.

43. Snow et al. (see note 36 above), 469.

44. Gurr (see note 15 above), 359.

45. Goodwin (see note 12 above), 2039.

46. Ibid., 2032–2033.

47. Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13 (1981): 384.

48. Goodwin (see note 12 above), 2033–2034.

49. Ibid., 2036.

50. Ibid., 2036–2037.

51. Goodwin defines "categorical terrorism" as that "directed against anonymous individuals by virtue of their belonging (or seeming to belong) to a specific ethnic or religious group, nationality, social class or some other collectivity." He eschews the term indiscriminate because of the explicit intention to target a given collective, if not specific individuals within it. See Goodwin (note 12 above), 2031.

52. Goodwin (see note 12 above), 2039–2041.

53. Ibid., 2040.

54. Robert Graves, *Greek Myths* (London: Folio Society, 1996), 464. The giant Antaeus was the progeny of the Greek God of the Sea, Poseidon, and the Earth Goddess Gaia. Antaeus drew his great strength from his contact with the earth, his mother's realm. He was ultimately defeated by Heracles who, finding he could not defeat Antaeus in a simple contest of strength, lifted the giant clear of the ground until, cut off from the source of his power, Antaeus weakened and died.

55. Oberschall (see note 10 above), 28–29.

56. Robert White, "From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army," *American Journal of Sociology* 94, no. 6 (May 1989): 1281.

57. White (see note 56 above), 1277.

58. This city is known to the Unionist community as Londonderry and to the Republican community as Derry. As a result, it is often referred to in politically neutral language as Londonderry/Derry, which in turn has led to the popular local nickname, Stroke City.

59. White (see note 56 above), 1284.

60. Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), *Internment—A Chronology of the Main Events*, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/intern/chron.htm

61. Philip Thomas, "Emergency and Anti-Terrorism Power: 9/11: USA and UK," *Fordham International Law Journal* 26 (April 2003): 1223–1224.

62. John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 167.

63. Peter Taylor, *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein* (London: Bloomsbury, 1998), 129–130.

64. Lord Diplock, *Report of the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in Northern Ireland* (December 1972).

65. CAIN (see note 60 above).

66. Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 162.

67. House of Lords Debates, *Hansard*, 12 January 1998.

68. White (see note 56 above), 1289.

69. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, *European Court of Human Rights Series A*, No. 25 (1978).

70. Owen Bowcott, "General Fought Plan to Intern Suspects," *The Guardian*, 1 January 2002.

71. Donald Jackson, "Prevention of Terrorism: The United Kingdom Confronts the European Convention on Human Rights," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 6, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 509.

72. Jackson (see note 71 above), 509.

73. See Sir Edward Compton, *Report of the Enquiry into Allegations against the Security Forces of Physical Brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of events on the 9th August 1971* (London: HMSO November 1971).

74. Compton (see note 73 above).

75. See Amnesty International, *Report on Allegations of Ill-Treatment Made by Persons Arrested Under the Special Powers Act after 8 August 1971*, 30 October 1971.

76. Jackson (see note 71 above), 507.

77. Ibid., 509.

78. See Ireland v. United Kingdom (see note 69 above).

79. Ibid.

80. See Taylor (see note 63 above).

81. Thomas (see note 61 above), 1223–1224.

82. Newsinger (see note 62 above), 166.

83. An earlier bomb exploded on an observation deck in the Post Office Tower, a London landmark, in October 1971, shortly after the introduction of internment. Although a claim of responsibility was made by the "Kilburn Battalion of the IRA," this incident is not usually considered to be part of a coordinated IRA campaign. The bomber (or bombers) was never formally identified.

84. BBC, *The Troubles Fact File* at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/troubles/factfiles/ira.shtml

85. White (see note 56 above), 1293.

86. Ibid., 1288.

87. Ibid., 1293.

88. This was the slogan Irish *Taoiseach* Seán Lemass gave to his policy of rapprochement towards Stormont. See Michael O'Sullivan, *Seán Lemass: A Biography* (Dublin: Blackwater Press, 1994), 182.

89. Newsinger (see note 62 above), 164.

90. Goodwin (see note 2 above), 25.

91. Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 76.

92. English (see note 91 above), 75–76.

93. Newsinger (see note 62 above), 164.

94. Benjamin Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorism* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995).

95. Steven David, "Israel's Policy of Targeted Killings," *Ethics and International Affairs* (Spring 2003): 117.

96. Yael Stein, "By Any Name Illegal and Immoral," *Ethics and International Affairs* (Spring 2003): 127.

97. See Simon Reeve, *One Day in September: The Full Story of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and the Israeli Revenge Operation, Wrath of God* (London: Faber & Faber, 2001) and Michael Gross, "Fighting by Other Means in the Mideast: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Assassination Policy," *Political Studies* 51 (2003): 351.

98. David (see note 95 above), 115.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid., 122.

101. Ariel Merari, "Israel Facing Terrorism" (2003 paper written for Harvard University's *Long-Term Strategy Project for Preserving Security and Democratic Norms in the War on Terror*, unpublished).

102. See Gal Luft, "The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing," *The Middle East Quarterly* X, no. 1 (Winter 2003).

103. Gross (see note 97 above), 357.

104. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Minister Rechavam Ze'evy* (17 October 2001) at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-%20Obstacle%20to%20Peace/Memorial/2001/Rechavam%20Ze-evy

105. Luft (see note 102 above).

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.

108. CNN, "Israel to End Targeted Killings," 3 February 2005 at http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/03/mideast/

109. See Global Security website: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/intifada2.htm (16 August 2005) and Sean Yom and Basel Saleh, "Palestinian Suicide Bombers: A Statistical Analysis," *ECAAR Newsletter* (November 2004) at http://www.ecaar.org/Newsletter/Nov04/saleh.htm

110. Jewish Virtual Library (August 2005) at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/hits.html

111. See Jonathan Tucker, "Strategies for Countering Terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli Experience," *Journal of Homeland Security* (March 2003).

112. BBC News, *Hamas Chiefs Insist Fight Goes On*, 13 August 2005, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4148732.stm

113. David (see note 95 above), 116 and Luft (see note 102 above).

114. Internet Haganah, *Special Information Bulletin - Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies* (28 February 2005) at http://haganah.org.il/harchives/003975.html#pij6

115. Internet Haganah (see note 114 above).

116. Yom and Saleh (see note 109 above).

117. David (see note 95 above), 111.

118. Stein (see note 95 above), 127.

119. Ibid., 132.

120. Ibid., 133.

121. Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, "The Sharm El-Sheikh Summit," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, No. 729 (10–16 February 2005).

122. Molly Moore, "Killings May Make Hamas More Formidable," *The Washington Post*, 25 April 2004.

123. Moore (see note 122 above).

124. F. Gregory Gause, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2005): 74.

125. Ibid.

126. Vincent Cannistraro, "Assassination is Wrong—and Dumb," *The Washington Post*, 30 August 2001.

127. Gross (see note 97 above), 360.

128. Turin Judge Gian Carlo Caselli quoted by Martha Crenshaw in "How Terrorism Declines," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 81–82.

129. Oberschall (see note 10 above), 28.

130. Antony Shugaar, "Introduction" in *Memoirs of an Italian Terrorist*, by Giorgio, translated with an introduction by Antony Shugarr (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003), 8.

131. Gianfranco Pasquino and Donatella Della Porta, "Interpretations of Italian Left-Wing Terrorism," in Peter Merkl, ed., *Political Violence and Terror* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 169.

132. Antony Shugaar (see note 130 above), 11 and Donatella Della Porta, "Institutional Responses to Terrorism: The Italian Case," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 153.

133. Leonard Weinberg, "The Violent Life: An Analysis of Left- and Right-Wing Terrorism in Italy," in Peter Merkl, ed., *Political Violence and Terror* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 145.

134. Shugaar (see note 130 above), 7.

135. Alison Jamieson, "Entry, Discipline and Exit in the Italian Red Brigades," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 2.

136. Oberschall (see note 10 above), 33.

137. Della Porta (see note 132 above), 153.

138. Shugaar (see note 130 above), 15.

139. Della Porta (see note 132 above), 154.

140. Ibid., 151.

141. Ibid., 151.

142. Ibid., 153 and Luciana Stortoni-Wortmann, "The Police Response to Terrorism in Italy from 1969 to 1983," in Fernando Reinares, ed., *European Democracies Against Terrorism* (Dartmouth: Ashgate. 2000), 149.

143. Della Porta (see note 132 above), 156 and Stortoni-Wortmann (see note 142 above), 161.

144. Stortoni-Wortman (see note 142 above), 161.

145. Ibid., 159.

146. Della Porta (see note 132 above), 152.

147. Della Porta (see note 132 above), 162 and Stortoni-Wortmann (see note 142 above), 159. Emergency legislation passed in this period included the introduction in 1980 of "preventative arrest" (Della Porta, 158), but this was quite narrowly utilized because of misgivings in the judiciary about the measure (Stortoni-Wortmann, 162) and so was not really a factor in the struggle for political legitimacy.

148. Della Porta (see note 132 above), 163.

149. Stortoni-Wortmann (see note 142 above), 159–161.

150. Ibid., 163.

151. Eileen MacDonald, *Shoot the Women First* (London: Fourth Estate, 1991), 191.

152. Claudio Celani, "A Strategy of Tension: The Case of Italy," *Executive Intelligence Review* (Four Part Series, March–April 2004).

153. Jamieson (see note 135 above), 12–14.

154. Della Porta (see note 132 above), 166 and Jamieson (see note 135 above), 16.

155. MacDonald (see note 151 above), 176.

156. Jamieson (see note 135 above), 16.

157. In 1986, the State went still further, extending sentence reductions to those who simply disassociated themselves form their former activities (Della Porta (see note 132 above), 167).

158. Della Porta (see note 132 above), 163.

159. *Toronto Telegram* editorial quoted in Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ''The Terrorists' Best Ally: The Québec Media Coverage of the FLQ Crisis in October 1970,'' *Canadian Journal of Communication* 25, no. 2 (2000): 15.

160. Jeffrey Ross and Ted Gurr, ''Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States,'' *Comparative Politics* 21, no. 4 (July 1989): 411.

161. Cohen-Almagor (see note 159 above), 8.

162. Ross and Gurr (see note 160 above), 405–406.

163. Sean Maloney, ''A Mere Rustle of Leaves: Canadian Strategy and the 1970 FLQ Crisis,'' *Canadian Military Journal* (Summer 2000): 76.

164. Reg Whitaker, ''Keeping up with the Neighbours? Canadian Responses to 9/11 in Historical and Comparative Context,'' *Osgoode Hall Law Journal* 41 (Summer/Fall 2003): 249.

165. Cohen-Almagor (see note 159 above), 14.

166. Ross and Gurr (see note 160 above), 412.

167. Ibid.

168. Whitaker (see note 164 above), 249 and G. Davidson Smith, ''Canada's Counter-Terrorism Experience,'' *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 87.

169. Whitaker (see note 164 above), 249.

170. Cohen-Almagor (see note 159 above), 14, Whitaker (see note 164 above), 250 and Smith (see note 168 above), 87.

171. Cohen-Almagor (see note 159 above), 15.

172. Ross and Gurr (see note 160 above), 413.

173. Ibid.

174. Smith (see note 168 above), 86.

175. Ross and Gurr (see note 160 above), 414 and Smith (see note 168 above), 86.

176. Ross and Gurr (see note 160 above), 413.

177. Smith (see note 168 above), 87.

178. Ulrike Meinhof quoted in Klaus Wasmund, ''The Political Socialization of West German Terrorists,'' in Peter Merkl, ed., *Political Violence and Terror* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 197.

179. Oberschall (see note 10 above), 28.

180. Wasmund (see note 178 above), 195 and Peter Merkl, ''West German Left-Wing Terrorism'' in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 176.

181. Merkl (see note 180 above), 177. See also Peter Fritzsche, ''Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy: Legacy of the '68 Movement or 'Burden of Fascism,''' *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1, no. 4 (1989): 470.

182. Richardson (see note 26 above), 42 and 169.

183. Merkl (see note 180 above), 181, Wasmund (see note 178 above), 195 and Fritzsche (see note 181 above), 473.

184. Jillian Becker, *Hitler's Children: Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang* (London: Diane Publishing Company, 1978).

185. Merkl (see note 180 above), 183.

186. Ibid.

187. Ibid., 193.

188. Ibid., 183–184.

189. Ibid., 186.

190. Ibid., 188.

191. Ibid., 173 and 190. A fourth RAF prisoner, Irmgard Moller, also tried to kill herself but survived. Ulrike Meinhof had already committed suicide in Stammheim prison in May 1976.

192. Merkl (see note 180 above), 166.

193. Wasmund (see note 178 above), 192.

194. Merkl (see note 180 above), 167.

195. Wasmund (see note 178 above), 193.

196. Hans Josef Horchem, ''The Decline of the Red Army Faction,'' *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 66–67.

197. Merkl (see note 180 above), 166 and Horchem (see note 196 above), 67.

198. International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism.

199. Merkl (see note 180 above), 191.

200. Wasmund (see note 178 above), 196.

201. Fritzsche (see note 181 above), 470.

202. Horchem (see note 29 above), 356.

203. Ibid.

204. Alex Schmid, "Terrorism and Democracy," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4, no. 4 (1992): 14.

205. Marighela (see note 1 above), 3.

206. John Lewis Gaddis, "Grand Strategy in the Second Term," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (January/February 2005): 3.

207. Goodwin (see note 2 above), 26.

208. Adrian Guelke, *Northern Ireland: The International Perspective* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1989), 119.

209. Crenshaw (see note 128 above),70.

210. Ross and Gurr (see note 160 above), 408–409.

211. Donatella Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 158.

212. White (see note 56 above), 1298.

213. Gurr (see note 15 above), 351.

214. Oberschall (see note 10 above), 36.

215. Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures*, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 186.